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"Hybrid Rulemaking" under the Administrative
Procedure Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis*
Stephen F. Williamst
By its terms the Administrative Procedure Act' (APA) divides
all rulemaking by federal agencies into two categories: "informal"
or "notice-and-comment" rulemaking under section 553, and "for-
mal" or "on-the-record" rulemaking under sections 556 and 557. An
agency must use formal rulemaking when "rules are required by
statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency
hearing."' 2 In such instances rules must be supported by substantial
evidence in the "record." '3 In addition, parties to the proceeding are
entitled to "conduct such cross-examination as may be required for
a full and true disclosure of the facts," although this may be cur-
tailed when a party will not "be prejudiced thereby."4 In notice-
and-comment rulemaking, by contrast, there is no requirement
that the rule be based upon evidence in a record. 5 And section 553
* This paper is the outgrowth of work I undertook as a consultant to the Committee on
Judicial Review of the Administrative Conference of the United States. Neither the Confer-
ence nor the Committee has approved this paper, but recommendations deriving from the
study have been approved by the Committee on Judicial Review. I am indebted to the
chairman of the Committee on Judicial Review, William H. Allen, to William F. Pedersen,
and to my colleague Alfred T. McDonnell, for innumerable constructive suggestions.
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado.
5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1970).
Id. § 553(c).
3 See id. § 706(2)(E).
Id. § 556(d).
California Citizens Band Ass'n v. United States, 375 F.2d 43, 54 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 844 (1967). But see, e.g., cases cited at notes 7-8 infra; cf. Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414-15 (1971).
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does not mention cross-examination: an agency need only afford
"interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making
through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or
without opportunity for oral presentation."'
This article deals with several recent judicial decisions that
have ordered an agency-despite the inapplicability of sections 556
and 557-to afford opponents of a rule substantially greater proce-
dural opportunities than are prescribed by section 553. The chal-
lenging parties in these cases have successfully asserted two distinct
types of rights: first, a somewhat qualified right of cross-
examination; 7 and second, a right of access to details of the agency's
methodology, thus permitting that methodology to be subjected to
meaningful criticism.8 None of these cases relied on the APA's pro-
cedural requirements concerning formal rulemaking;9 indeed, sev-
eral of the opinions showed no inclination to rule that the particular
decision-making process in contention fell anywhere within APA
classifications. 0 Thus, with only a little help from Congress, the
courts seem to have created a procedural category that might be
termed "hybrid rulemaking" or "notice-and-comment-plus."
This article has several purposes: first, to explore in a general
way the differences between fact-finding used for promulgating a
6 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970).
, International Harvester Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 629-31, 649 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 503 (4th Cir. 1973); Walter Holm & Co.
v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1260
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (semble) (requiring "the process of testing and illumination ordinarily asso-
ciated with adversary, adjudicative procedures").
8 Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 487 F.2d 1043, 1071, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1973), vacated and
remanded, 417 U.S. 964 (1974); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 402
(D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974); Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238,
1260, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (semble); International Harvester Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d
615, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
1 See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1250-51 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (denying
that formal rulemaking requirements applied); International Harvester Corp. v. Ruckelshaus,
478 F.2d 615, 630 n.48 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (same).
10 In Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973), the Fourth Circuit
declared:
It is idle, and fruitless, to boggle over the appropriate classification of the Administra-
tor's action, though we cannot avoid observing that the Administrator, in his order of
approval, described his action as "rulemaking". Modem precedent has discarded such
classifications as criteria for determining the type of hearing to which the parties affected
by administrative action are entitled. ...
Id. at 500. See also Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 487 F.2d 1043, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
vacated and remanded, 417 U.S. 964 (1974) (declining to reach the problem of classifying);
Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (ignoring the issue). But see
Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393 n.67 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 921 (1974) (identifying the rulemaking as informal).
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rule and fact-finding used for applying a pre-existing rule; second,
to consider under what legal theories, and in what circumstances, a
court may be justified in imposing procedural burdens upon an
agency engaged in rulemaking; third, to describe how selected
cases" have actually influenced the agencies involved, and to assess
empirically the effectiveness and costs of the procedures prescribed;
and, finally, to suggest some considerations that might bear on the
propriety of similar judicial intervention in the future.
I. PROLOGUE: THE DISTINCTIVE NATURE OF FACT-FINDING
FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROMULGATING RULES
A misunderstanding of the facts can be as unfortunate in devel-
oping a rule of law as in determining whether defendant breached
his contractual duty to plaintiff. Lochner v. New York" is a classic
instance. Without any detailed factual inquiry, and without any
serious review of the legislature's factual inquiry, the Court resolved
the constitutionality of a statute limiting the working hours of bak-
ers; an apparently crucial part of its decision was an empirical asser-
tion about whether work in a bakery posed significant risks to the
bakers' health.'3
Yet courts have rarely intervened to assure that parties ad-
versely affected by administrative rulemaking will have an ade-
quate opportunity to challenge the factual assumptions underlying
the rules. This judicial reluctance may be explained by the differ-
ences in the institutional setting and intellectual processes that are
involved in fact resolution for rulemaking purposes, on the one
hand, and for adjudicative purposes, on the other.
Justice Holmes's opinion in Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v.
State Board of Equalization" is the most salient intellectual antece-
dent of "informal" rulemaking procedures, and it focuses directly
on the institutional setting. On the theory that tax assessments in
Denver were, as a whole, radically lower than assessments in the
remainder of Colorado, the State Board of Equalization and the
Colorado Tax Commission had ordered an across-the-board increase
of forty percent in valuations of taxable property in Denver. The
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff, a Denver taxpayer, had no
right to a hearing before either state agency. Holmes wrote:
" Cases cited notes 7-8 supra.
12 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
11 Id. at 59.
" 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
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Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is
impracticable that every one should have a direct voice in its
adoption. The Constitution does not require all public acts to
be done in town meeting or an assembly of the whole. General
statutes within the state power are passed that affect the per-
son or property of individuals, sometimes to the point of ruin,
without giving them a chance to be heard. Their rights are
protected in the only way that they can be in a complex society,
by their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the
rule. 5
In its assumption that a "hearing" is infeasible when the inter-
ests of many people are at stake,, the argument is inadequate on its
face. Of course each person affected by a general rule cannot indi-
vidually enjoy the type of hearing associated with adjudication. But
an agency can nevertheless permit a suitable champion to represent
the entire group (or each of several conflicting interest groups).
Class actions are and always have been built upon the feasibility of
such techniques. 6 And in recent times the concept of representation
has been used to justify relaxing the prerequisites of standing to sue
administrative agencies.' 7
A second dimension to Justice Holmes's concern about the
numbers affected is more plausible: the possibly greater utility of
the political process as a check upon administrative error. When a
single citizen is the victim of an erroneous adjudicative decision the
prospect of political relief is remote. With an increase in the number
of persons adversely affected, the chance of political relief may,
ceteris paribus, rise proportionately. Recent history gives some sup-
port to Justice Holmes's assumption. Just in the past year, two
regulations originally promulgated in the interests of health and
safety-Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rules calling for
11 Id. at 445.
16 See, e.g., Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Smith v. Sworm-
stedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853); Hichens v. Congreve, 4 Russ. 562, 38 Eng. Rep. 917 (Ch.
1828); Good v. Blewitt, 13 Ves. Jun. 397, 33 Eng. Rep. 343 (Ch. 1807); Chancey v. May, Prec.
Ch. 592, 24 Eng. Rep. 265 (Ch. 1722). In Bi-Metallic itself, the Denver assessor was available
as such a champion; having been joined in the suit, he objected to the "equalization" decree
and complained that he had not been afforded an opportunity to be heard. 239 U.S. at 444.
If mere numbers were dispositive, it would seem to follow that in class actions the class
or even its champion should have no constitutional right to the procedural benefits of an
adjudicative hearing. Yet no one suggests such a result. See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v.
Cauble, supra.
,1 See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 616-17 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
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parking surcharges in order to diminish center-city air pollution,"8
and Department of Transportation rules requiring auto makers to
install devices that disable a car from operating unless safety belts
are fastened' 9-have been withdrawn as a result of adverse political
pressure.
But even here there are some grounds for doubt. The relative
rarity of clear-cut examples, and the fact that the rules in the two
above examples directly affected vast numbers of people, point up
the limited availability of political relief. To be sure, the possibility
of legislative intervention, presumably often mirroring public senti-
ment, sometimes operates prophylactically to prevent an agency
from adopting socially unacceptable rules. Even preliminary steps
towards legislative activity, such as subcommittee hearings, may
cast a shadow on agency zeal. But for vast areas of decision making
normally classified as legislative rather than adjudicatory, one must
retain serious doubts about the efficacy of the political check, par-
ticularly in view of the tortuous path of legislation, and the enor-
mous number of rules being promulgated by administrative agen-
cies.
Justice Holmes's distinction may appear in a still more plausi-
ble light if the intellectual processes involved in fact-finding for
rulemaking purposes are compared with those employed in adjudi-
cation."0 Both types of decision involve (1) gathering evidence in the
form of sense perceptions, and (2) drawing inferences from the per-
ceptions. Consider first an example of adjudication-a simple auto-
mobile negligence case-in which the plaintiff claims, through
largely circumstantial evidence, that the accident was due to the
defendant's drunken driving. Witnesses may testify to their experi-
ences in terms of certain raw perceptions: witness A that he per-
ceived tire marks on the pavement in a certain configuration;
witness B that he saw the defendant stagger from a tavern ten
minutes before the accident; witness C that he examined the
wrecked cars and perceived the nature of the damage to each car;
witness D that he examined the plaintiff in the hospital and per-
ceived the injuries to his body. If the fact-finder is to make anything
of these perceptions, a second type of evidence will also be neces-
" See 39 Fed. Reg. 1848 (1974). Ultimately, Congress passed legislation forbidding the
EPA to require parking surcharges. See Energy Supply & Environmental Coordination Act
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-319, § 4(b), 88 Stat. 246 (June 22, 1974).
1, 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1973).
2 As used in this discussion, the term "adjudication" refers only to the application of
rules, not to their formulation (even within an adjudicatory proceeding).
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sary. Witnesses will therefore be asked to testify to certain infer-
ences that may be drawn from the perceptions: witness A may give
an opinion about the speed and direction of the cars; witness C
about the cost of repairs and other appraisable property loss; wit-
ness D about the expected medical expenses and disabilities of the
plaintiff. The witnesses may allude to a body of established knowl-
edge and perhaps to particular experiments and case histories to
substantiate their opinions. The fact-finder will assess the credibil-
ity of the perceptions and the probability of the suggested infer-
ences, and then determine what probably happened and how much
injury resulted.
Superficially, the process of developing factual support for a
proposed rule will run a similar course. In the case of a health
regulation, for example, the agency may begin with studies setting
forth certain raw perceptions: that a group of initially healthy rats
demonstrated symptoms similar to those of cancer after exposure to
a certain chemical. The agency must then determine whether to
infer a significant risk to humans from the demonstrated risk to
rats. Parties may offer studies purporting to show that the disputed
chemical has had no carcinogenic effect on dogs or monkeys; that
even for rats there is a threshold level of exposure, below which no
carcinogenic effect has been perceived; or that no one has ever per-
ceived a carcinogenic effect on humans exposed to the disputed
chemical. This process, too, will raise issues concerning the accu-
racy of the perceptions of raw data and the plausibility of the infer-
ences sought to be drawn. The agency will conclude with some judg-
ment about the range of probability of cancer at various levels of
exposure.
At some point, however, the intellectual process will diverge
from that involved in adjudication. Because the agency's legislative
mandate will almost certainly have been formulated in rather gen-
eral terms (calling, perhaps, for the imposition of restrictions rea-
sonably intended to promote human health), knowing the level of
risk associated with various levels of exposure will not dispose of the
issue. Trade-offs based essentially upon value judgments will be
necessary."1 By contrast, a court or jury finding facts in order to
21 Suppose, for example, that a completely value-neutral fact-finder would conclude that
workers exposed to a given level of the chemical will annually suffer a one-in-ten-thousand
risk of contracting cancer; that the only feasible restriction of the industrial process is total
prohibition; and that this process is essential for the manufacture of a medically useful drug.
At this stage of rulemaking, the agency members inescapably doff their hats as value-neutral
fact-finders and assume the role of legislators of values, deciding whether society should
accept the cancer risk or do without the drug.
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apply a rule of law is theoretically able to do so in a value-free way.22
Authoritative statements of the rule, including where the burden of
persuasion lies and how high the standard of proof is, will' largely
have resolved the value issues.
At this point Justice Holmes's readiness to limit a person ad-
versely affected by administrative rulemaking to his political rem-
edy takes on a slightly different coloration. The Bi-Metallic prefer-
ence for the political remedy makes sense in comparative terms.
Holmes may have meant not that the political remedy is ideal, but
merely that when the ultimate issues require value judgments that
are not susceptible to "proof, '23 the check afforded by the proce-
dural protections of a hearing may be even less worthwhile-
especially when one considers the costs in time and energy involved
in such procedural checks.
This is not to say that the procedural requirements associated
with adjudication are of no use as a check to lawless rulemaking.
Whenever the perception of raw data is at stake, or doubts are raised
about the analytical underpinnings of competing inferences, those
requirements may play more or less the role that they do when a rule
is being applied to a historical episode. 24 But, since agency rulemak-
The model is complicated by the fact that insertions of values into the rulemaking
process do not necessarily come tidily at the end, as I have implied in the text. A scientist's
expert judgment about factual probabilities is often clouded by concern about the re-
sult-concern that either a "too restrictive" or "too lenient" regulation may emerge unless
the agency accepts his view as to the correct factual inference. Here mystical incanta-
tions-such as "expert opinion" or "engineering judgment"-are likely to conceal the extent
to which the proposed inference is based on value judgment rather than objective analysis of
probabilities. Thus, it is perhaps significant that agencies rarely use advanced methods of
statistics to express their factual findings in terms of probabilities. But compare the tech-
nique employed by the EPA in the emissions suspension case, discussed in text and notes at
notes 231-33 infra.
2 Of course, there will be gray areas, where the rule is so ill-defined that a covert value
judgment must be made in order to apply it to the fact. Cf. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW
123-25 (1881). And judges or juries may inject their values into the fact-finding. For example,
in the face of a near-certain probability of contributory negligence, they may decide for the
plaintiff because of their value judgment that the risk of mistakenly denying relief to a
plaintiff with a good claim is far less acceptable than the risk of mistakenly giving relief to a
plaintiff without a claim. Nonetheless, it seems fair to say that values play a far less signifi-
cant role in the finding of facts for the purpose of applying law than for the purpose of
promulgating law.
2 See Grey, Book Review, 25 STAN. L. REv. 286 (1973); Leff, Book Review, 60 VA. L. REv.
451 (1974).
2, This is apparently what Professor Robinson meant when he wrote:
[I]t is doubtful that predictive judgment is radically different from determinations
of historical fact. In both cases the determination must almost invariably rest on general
conclusions that are inferred from particular factual data and an evaluation of the
probabilities that may be as appropriate for testimonial proof and cross-examination in
the one case as in the other.
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ing involves the exercise of a delegated portion of the legislature's
power to make trade-offs between competing values, the relative
significance of "accurate" factual investigation is reduced. For to
the extent that the agency, simply by recasting its value judgment,
may achieve its original result despite being forced to correct its
factual errors, the benefits that are supposed to be derived from
precision are vitiated. 5
In addition to the pervasiveness of value judgments, there is
another factor that may make society less determined to achieve
factual accuracy in rulemaking. It is partly captured in Judge Lev-
enthal's epigram in the Blocked Space"5 case that with some issues
"a month of experience will be worth a year of hearings." Seem-
ingly, this distinction sharply delineates between adjudication and
rulemaking. A party who loses an adjudication will ordinarily never
benefit from anything that happens after the judgment in his case
is entered; 27 the victim of an improper rule may hope that experi-
ence will show the agency the error of its ways and bring about
correction. "Feedback" is possible in the rulemaking context, not in
the application of a rule to a past event.
On closer examination, the distinction is not quite such a bright
line. First, it ignores the unfortunate circumstance that ultimate
Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudica-
tion and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 522 (1970).
2 A recent decision of the District of Columbia Circuit, wrestling with the principle that
"substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole" shall be the scope of review for
regulations promulgated under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655(f)
(Supp. 1975), analyzed the rulemaking function in somewhat similar terms. Judge McGowan
wrote:
What we are entitled to at all events is a careful identification by the Secretary, when
his proposed standards are challenged, of the reasons why he chooses to follow one course
rather than another. Where that choice purports to be based on the existence of certain
determinable facts, the Secretary must, in form as well as substance, find those facts
from evidence in the record. By the same token, when the Secretary is obliged to make
policy judgments where no factual certainties exist or where facts alone do not provide
the answer, he should so state and go on to identify the considerations he found persu-
asive.
Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475-76 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Judge
McGowan's term "policy judgments" seems to encompass what I have refered to as value
judgments-principles that cannot be "proven" right or wrong. Where value judgments were
involved, therefore, the court concluded that it could only ask the Secretary to identify the
considerations he had found persuasive, so that the court might be assured that he had acted
in compliance with the statutory purposes. For a somewhat looser formulation of the same
distinction, see Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 740-41 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
26 American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 632-33 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 843 (1966).
It might seem that injunctive decrees, which are frequently made modifiable by the
issuing court, are an exception. But such "regulatory" decrees are actually a good deal like
administrative rules.
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correction of the error will not indemnify the interim losers for what
they suffered before the agency saw the light.28 Second, it may take
an extraordinarily dreadful rule to make Judge Leventhal's time
estimate realistic. In the Blocked Space case, for example, four
years elapsed before the agency abandoned the rule, despite some
reason to believe that the bases ultimately asserted for the reversal
should have been reasonably apparent to the agency at the time of
the original adoption. 9 Third, the teachings of experience (except
in the most egregious cases) are likely to be subject to precisely the
same ambiguities as the factual data on which the rule originally
was based. If the rule fails to deliver the hoped-for results, its
proponents will often be able to explain away its failure and to
suggest supplementary rules that may bring about success. The
absence of an effectively isolated "control group" may make it
practically impossible to build an impregnable factual record
against such contentions. Fourth, the establishment of a bureauc-
racy to implement the rule will create an institutional obstacle to
repeal, tending to offset whatever advantages experience may have
provided .30
It seems, nevertheless, that there is force to Judge Leventhal's
point. And although his epigram deals with the peculiar ability of
an agency to conduct a legislative experiment (adopting a rule to
see how it works out), the analysis can also be applied to the
agency's institutional ability to conduct all kinds of experiments,
some of which may be scientific or technical, rather than legislative.
The role of such experiments in rulemaking suggests several factors
that further militate against making rules by using the kind of pro-
cedures associated with adjudicative fact-finding.
First, the rulemaking framework offers the possibility of dis-
carding the results of a questionable study and conducting an im-
proved experiment. If, for instance, someone challenges whether
Perhaps the notion that rules produced by "rulemaking" have only "future effect"
accounts in part for the general disregard of this fact. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970). Of course,
the effects of all human decisions take place in the future, but regrettably these effects still
may heavily penalize past decisions. Thus a rule purporting to have only future effect ("fossil-
fueled electric plants must reduce their emissions of sulfur dioxide to so many grams per BTU
equivalent of fuel used in the process") may have a devastating impact on the value of past
investments-far more so than a knuckle-rapping fine for a past violation.
2 See Robinson, supra note 24, at 530-31.
m In practice, the most clearcut effect of experience may be to reinforce an agency's
successful initial inclination. If, for example, an agency adopts a regulation in the face of a
"parade of horribles" predicted by the parties who expect to be adversely affected, and the
horribles demonstrably fail to materialize, the agency may rightly be emboldened to similar
ventures in the future. The peril, of course, is that the agency may misread, or exaggerate,
the lessons of the first success.
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those who conducted a given experiment with rats measured accur-
ately the amounts of a substance to which they were subjected, or
if it is suggested that the study is flawed given the potential effects
of the hypodermic needle employed, it may be possible to conduct
another study that eliminates the alleged defects. Although such
experimental flexibility may occasionally be possible in connection
with adjudication also, the chances seem much more remote in the
latter context.
Second, the sort of error in perception that is the typical target
of cross-examination possesses relatively minor significance in the
rulemaking framework. Almost any important experiment will in-
volve observing a substantial number of events or conditions-for
example, the health of a number of rats after various exposures to
an allegedly cancer-producing substance. Although individual er-
rors may well occur, one would expect that, in the absence of a
methodological error, they would tend to cancel each other out.
Consequently, there is less need for elaborate procedures to verify
each observation than when the issue is, say, whether the defendant
was speeding.
The Bi-Metallic case itself illustrates the point. Although the
case involved "values" of property, one cannot argue that "value
judgments" were to be made. In making property tax assessments
subjective concepts of "value"-what the owner would demand for
his property or any particular person might offer for it-are largely
put aside in favor of a (purportedly) objective concept, "market
value." Why then should Denver property owners have been denied
an opportunity to contest the proposition that their properties had
been undervalued by 40 percent?
The concept of experiments gives an answer. Assume that the
state board employed a valuation method that would have been
regarded as an acceptable analytical method given the standards
prevalent at that time.31 Presumably, this method involved compar-
isons between the Denver assessor's valuations and "true" market
values. Miscomputations in the valuation of any particular property
would tend to be of minimal significance for a large sampling; in the
absence of systematic error, miscomputations in one direction
would presumably tend to be offset by error in the opposite direc-
tion. Thus, the acceptability of the state board's judgment would
turn upon the propriety of its method; if its method was improper,
31 Neither the Supreme Court opinion nor that of the Supreme Court of Colorado offers
a clue as to the method employed. State Bd. of Equalization v. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co., 56 Colo.
512, 138 P. 1010 (1914), aff'd, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
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its judgment would be invalid as arbitrary or capricious, at least at
some point. The Court may have felt that judicial review for arbi-
trariness (together with political remedies) represented sufficient
protection against sloppy agency fact-finding. 32
This is not the place to attempt a comprehensive analysis of the
line between rulemaking and adjudication for purposes of determin-
ing when the constitutional requirement of due process calls for a
"hearing." But, as will be seen, the factors that have just been
outlined may help to explain why the hybrid rulemaking procedures
mandated by the courts have, in the end, provided very little tangi-
ble benefit to the aggrieved parties.
IX. SOURCES OF JUDICIAL POWER TO IMPOSE
HYBRID RULEMAKING PROCEDURES
The courts' occasional insistence that agencies observe proce-
dural niceties not prescribed in section 553 inevitably poses a ques-
tion of legitimacy. Whether the potential objection be framed in
terms of "separation of powers," "jurisdiction," or whatever, it is
not self-evident that the federal judiciary has any basis for giving
independent regulatory agencies or branches of the executive de-
partment instructions about how they should engage in fact-
gathering.
A. Section 553
We should note preliminarily that the courts have by no means
explored the full reach of section 553's requirements. For example,
section 553(c) requires the agency to give interested persons "an
opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission
of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for
oral presentation." That provision appears to give an agency discre-
tion to grant or withhold the chance for oral presentation; but since
section 706(2) (A) authorizes a court to set aside agency action found
to be "an abuse of discretion," denial of a request for oral argument
32 Yet one may question whether judicial review for arbitrariness represented a feasible
avenue for relief at the time of Bi-Metallic. It is very hard to see how the complainants in
that case could have exposed any methodological error to judicial view. The requirement that
agencies must make formal findings did not appear until 1922. See Wichita R.R. & Light Co.
v. Public Util. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 48, 58 (1922). Furthermore, the complainants probably
could not have made a colorable allegation that the ruling was confiscatory and thereby
obtained a trial, cf. Chicago, M. & S.P. Ry. v. Tompkins, 176 U.S. 167 (1900), and outside
the area of confiscation, apparently, judicial trial of legislative facts was still unavailable. See
Borden's Farm Prods. Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, 211-13 (1934), and cases cited.
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could, in some cases, be held reversible error.33
Section 553(c)'s requirement of an opportunity to participate
could also give rise to claims that the "notice" required by section
553(b) should be broadly conceived. Although section 553(b)(3)
merely requires that the notice include "either the terms or sub-
stance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues
involved," an objector could argue that in some circumstances the
553(b)(3) notice should set forth not only the proposed regulation
but also a statement of its factual premises and methodology, suffi-
ciently detailed to permit objectors to make a meaningful use of
their section 553(c) "opportunity to participate."34
B. The Constitution
The APA definition of a rule, "an agency statement of general
or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement,
interpret, or prescribe law or policy . . . .,,3 is so broad that it
obviously must cover a number of circumstances that require adju-
dicatory procedures because of the due process clause. A literal
reading of the APA might suggest that Congress has prescribed only
"notice-and-comment" rulemaking for at least some of these situa-
tions. The Supreme Court's decision in Wong Yang Sung v.
McGrath" indicates, however, that the APA itself automatically
sweeps such cases into the class governed by the adjudicatory tech-
niques of sections 556 and 557. In Wong Yang Sung, the Court dealt
with section 554's "separation-of-functions" rule, which prohibits
agency personnel involved in investigatory or prosecutorial func-
tions from also participating in agency decision-making. By its
terms, this provision applies to "every case of adjudication required
by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing, ' 37 and the Court held that the prohibition also ap-
plies to an adjudication required by the Constitution-but not by
3 See Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. United States, 368 F. Supp. 925, 946 (D.
Del. 1973) (noting that the denial of an opportunity to make an oral presentation is "presuma-
bly" reviewable for abuse of discretion, but finding no abuse in the circumstances presented).
It might be argued, however, that such reliance on section 706(2)(A)'s authorization of rever-
sal for abuse of discretion would be an unwarranted extension of section 706(2)(D), which
authorizes the reviewing court to overturn agency action for failure to observe "procedure
required by law."
31 Judge Leventhal relied in part on this argument in Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckels-
haus, 486 F.2d 375, 393 n.67 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
s 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970). But see id. § 551(6), which excludes licensing from the
category of rulemaking.
339 U.S. 33 (1950).
5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
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statute-to be determined in that way.
Section 553(c) employs almost identical language: "[w]hen
rules [as defined in the language quoted above] are required by
statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency
hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this title apply instead of this
subsection." And the remedial purpose of the APA, invoked in
Wong Yang Sung to justify a generous interpretation of section 554,
would seem equally pertinent in the construction of section 553(c).11
In most situations, therefore, when the Constitution requires some-
thing more than section 553 procedures, it will require the full
gamut of procedures mandated for "on-the-record" rulemaking. On
the other hand, to the extent that rules of general (as opposed to
particular) applicability are concerned, the burden of Bi-Metallic
would seem to be that the Constitution imposes no procedural con-
straints upon the agency-other than the restraints, if any, it might
impose upon a legislature acting directly. 9
C. The Agency's Authorizing Statute
Congress is of course free to require that an agency, in promul-
gating regulations, adhere to procedures superseding those of sec-
tion 553, and in recent years it has often done so. These require-
ments have included consultation with a specific person or group,
creation of and consultation with an advisory committee, and provi-
sion of an opportunity for oral testimony and argument." Fre-
quently, the Congressional message is far from clear,4" thus leaving
substantial room for judicial interpretation.
It is fair to say that the attitude of the Supreme Court toward
these ambiguities has altered sharply since such decisions as
Morgan 142 and Morgan II." Both addressed the question of how a
statutory "full hearing" obligation affected the Secretary of Agricul-
ture's power to set "just and reasonable" rates for stockyards.
Morgan I found the phrase to contain the now much-diluted require-
ment that the one who decides the case must hear," and Morgan II
38 See Note, The Judicial Role in Defining Procedural Requirements for Agency
Rulemaking, 87 HARv. L. REv. 782, 791 (1974) [hereinafter cited as HARVARD NOTE].
1, Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915). But cf.
Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 503 (4th Cir. 1973).
" See Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The
Need for Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALF. L. REv. 1276, 1313-
18 (1972).
,1 Id. at 1319-23.
,2 Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936).
Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938).
" 298 U.S. at 481.
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found it to encompass a requirement that the issues be formulated
in advance of final decision with sufficient clarity that opponents
of the proposed outcome could know what they had to oppose. In
both opinions, Chief Justice Hughes characterized the proceedings
as "quasi-judicial. ' 45 From the tenor of the opinions, one might
suspect that the Court would have found that the statutory phrase
"full hearing" embodied, in some degree, almost every conceivable
attribute of adjudicatory proceedings.
The most recent Supreme Court interpretation of a Congres-
sional "hearing" requirement is worlds apart. United States v. Flor-
ida East Coast Railway Co.4" paralleled the Morgan cases in that it
involved the power of an agency (here the ICC) to prescribe rates
for the future. The Interstate Commerce Act 4 provided that the rate
prescription should be made only "after hearing." Speaking through
Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that the "hearing" requirement
did not trip the case over into the section 556-557 class, 48 and, fur-
ther, that the requirement was fully satisfied by a section 553 pro-
ceeding. 9 The ICC proceeding was undoubtedly "rulemaking" as
defined in the APA, so that section 553 would have governed if the
Interstate Commerce Act had been silent about procedures; conse-
quently, the Court's decision rendered the latter statute's express
requirement of a "hearing" completely without practical effect.
The Court's handling of an argument based upon ICC v. Louis-
ville & Nashville Railroad Co." superficially suggests that in other
contexts a statutory requirement of a "hearing" can be read to call
for more than section 553 procedures. Louisville & Nashville had
interpreted a similar provision to require that all "parties must be
fully apprised of the evidence submitted or to be considered, and
must be given opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, to inspect
documents and to offer evidence in explanation or rebuttal.""1 Since
the statute originally authorizing the Florida East Coast ratemaking
proceeding had been enacted just four years after Louisville &
298 U.S. at 480; 304 U.S. at 14, 18.
46 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
7 Section 1(14)(a) of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, provides:
The Commission may, after hearing on a complaint or upon its own initiative without
complaint, establish reasonable rules, regulations, and practices with respect to car
service by common carriers by railroad subject to this chapter, including the compensa-
tion to be paid. ...
49 U.S.C. § 1(14)(a) (1970).
410 U.S. at 234-38.
Id. at 238-46.
227 U.S. 88 (1913).
Id. at 93.
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Nashville, the railroads in Florida East Coast argued that the
phrase should be given the same meaning as in Louisville &
Nashville. Justice Rehnquist rejected the argument, seemingly on
the grounds that Louisville & Nashville involved refunds, while the
rates to be fixed in Florida East Coast were prospective only.52 The
implication would appear to be that the meaning of the statutory
term "hearing" may vary according to the nature of the decision to
be made.
But this contention fails to consider a significant element of the
factual situation before the Court. A ratemaking proceeding involv-
ing a refund order would not fall within the terms of section 553 at
all, since rules within the meaning of the APA are limited to deci-
sions of "future effect."53 Thus, all we are left with is the rather
tautological proposition that where an authorizing statute requires
a "hearing" in a context to which section 553 is not applicable, the
scope of the "hearing" is not confined to the procedures described
in section 553.
It might also be argued that Florida East Coast's refusal to give
the word "hearing" any meaning at all is limited to statutes ante-
dating the APA.54 The argument would be that Congress's use of the
term "hearing" in 1917 can be attributed merely to the then existing
vacuum in common understanding about the normal procedures for
rulemaking-a vacuum filled by enactment of the APA. The corol-
lary would be that a "hearing" requirement in a post-APA statute
has to be given some meaning, namely, that it requires procedures
beyond those coming into effect automatically under section 553.
The difficulty with the argument is that the Court in Florida
East Coast went to some lengths to chill any such notion. The Inter-
state Commerce Act had been amended in 1966 to direct the ICC
to consider the impact of the rates upon the adequacy of the nation's
freight car supply.5 Because this legislative action had simply al-
tered the substantive terms under which the ICC was to exercise its
preexisting authority, the Court could have disregarded the amend-
ment and addressed its decision only to "hearing" requirements
enacted prior to the passage of the APA. Instead, Justice Rehnquist
wrote: "Under these circumstances, confronted with a grant of sub-
stantive authority made after the Administrative Procedure Act was
enacted, we think that reference to that Act, in which Congress
52 410 U.S. at 244-45.
5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970).
5, Cf. HARVARD NoTE, supra note 38, at 794.
" See 410 U.S. at 225-31.
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devoted itself exclusively to questions such as the nature and scope
of hearings, is a satisfactory basis for determining what is meant by
the term 'hearing' used in another statute." 6 Thus the Court aggres-
sively insisted upon treating the ICC's authorizing statute as bear-
ing not only a 1917 date but also a 1966 one.57
In sum, where Congress has required a "hearing" in a case that
would otherwise be covered by section 553, it will be difficult to
persuade a court after Florida East Coast that the "hearing" re-
quirement calls for additional adjudicative-type procedures. Consti-
tutional overtones or exceptionally clear statutory history might
prove persuasive, but in run-of-the-mill cases the Supreme Court
will likely declare that a "hearing" requirement is fully met by
compliance with section 553.
A similar ambiguity is presented in statutory provisions for
judicial review that establish a standard of "substantial evidence"
and call for an agency to file with the court "the record upon which
the order complained of was entered." 8 The Attorney General's
manual on the APA viewed such provisions as making sections 556
and 557 applicable6 and two panels of the District of Columbia
Circuit have found in them a basis for requiring hybrid rulemaking
in two of the cases examined in this article, Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC0
and Public Service Commission v. FPC.5 ' On the other hand, the
Tenth Circuit in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. FPC,12 and another panel
51 Id. at 240 (emphasis added).
51 Alternatively, the argument could be inverted. Working from the sentence quoted in
the text, one could contend that Florida East Coast's narrow reading of the "hearing" require-
ment should be confined to statutes enacted or reenacted after the adoption of the APA. See
Comment, Ratemaking by Informal Rulemaking Under the Natural Gas Act, 74 COLUM. L.
REV. 752, 759-60 (1974). But the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Allegheny-
Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742 (1972), and the references to that case in Florida East Coast
substantially undermine the claim. In Allegheny-Ludlum, the Court reviewed a rule promul-
gated by the ICC under the same Interstate Commerce Act provision in its unamended form.
The Court summarily classified the proceeding as coming under section 553. See 406 U.S. at
755-58. In Florida East Coast, Justice Rehnquist reaffirmed that holding and framed the issue
before him as a question of whether the 1966 amendment justified any different result. 410
U.S. at 234-35.
See Natural Gas Act § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1970).
' UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL OF THE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT 33 (1947) [hereinafter cited as ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL]. This
passage is essentially an interpretation of the proviso of section 553(c), which makes sections
556 and 557 applicable when "rules are required by statute to be made on the record after
opportunity for an agency hearing."
60 483 F.2d 1238, 1257-63 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
6 487 F.2d 1043, 1069-71 (D.C. Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 417 U.S. 964 (1974).
.2 475 F.2d 842, 851-52 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974) (despite the
fact that the ratemaking in question evidently involved retroactive application, so that all
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of the District of Columbia Circuit in American Public Gas Associa-
tion v. FPC,3 have seemingly rejected such contentions. The issue
has been the subject of considerable scholarly comment; 4 and the
Administrative Conference has expressly recommended against
finding that a statutory requirement of "substantial evidence on the
record" implies any sort of procedural obligation. 5 Florida East
Coast suggests, of course, that the Supreme Court will not read
ambiguous language of this kind very expansively.
D. The Necessities of Judicial Review
As the above discussion demonstrates, and as the cases have
tacitly recognized, the Constitution and specific statutory provi-
sions often provide no firm foundation for the imposition of hybrid
rulemaking requirements. But the courts have not been deterred by
legislative silence. Declining to insist on direct statutory support,
they have adopted a pragmatic outlook, resting their holdings on the
necessities of substantive review.
The typical situation prompting this stance can be briefly
sketched. No matter what the standard of review in an appeal from
an agency rulemaking proceeding, the record before the court (in-
cluding detailed factual allegations by the challengers) may leave
room for doubt about a necessary factual predicate of an otherwise
valid rule, so that the court is unable, without more, to affirm the
rule. Take, for example, the primary ambient air standards that the
Environmental Protection Agency is authorized to prescribe in order
to "protect the public health."66 A complete absence of any link
between public health and the standard promulgated for any given
pollutant will presumably be fatal to the validity of that standard.
If the record compiled by the agency contains only vague and con-
clusory statements about the alleged link, and if a challenger offers
precise factual contentions rebutting the existence of the link, the
APA rulemaking provisions were inapplicable to that extent, see id. at 857 (Seth, J.,
dissenting)).
- 498 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
" Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REV. 185, 247-48 (1974);
Scalia & Goodman, Procedural Aspects of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 20 U.C.L.A.L.
REV. 899, 934-35 (1973); HARVARD NOTE, supra note 38, at 803-05.
A contention has also been advanced that a provision for judicial review of the "record,"
without more, triggers section 553(c)'s proviso and renders sections 556 and 557 applicable.
The position has been rejected in Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d
330, 336-37 (D.C. Cir. 1968); cf. Hamilton, supra note 40, at 1322-23.
"3 See Recommendation 74-4, 1973-74 REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES 58.
" Clean Air Act § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4(b)(1) (1970).
1975l
The University of Chicago Law Review
court cannot approve the standard until factual clarification is
achieved.
There are three devices for supplementing the record. The first
is the main subject of this article: a remand for hybrid rulemaking.
The other two are (1) trial de novo in court,"7 and (2) a remand to
the agency after the manner of Chenery I, o that is, with a demand
for a more precise articulation of the findings and considerations
upon which the rule is based, or for a demonstration that the rule
is founded on factors made relevant by the authorizing statute.
The two alternative devices require serious consideration. The
option of judicial trial de novo puts the issue of hybrid rulemaking
into perspective: if a court may indeed employ judicial trial, then
it would appear to have, almost a fortiori, a power to remand to the
agency with specific procedural instructions. The option of remand
for a better statement of reasons also contributes perspective, but
from a different angle: to the extent that it can assure a record
sufficient for substantive judicial review, its availability militates
against judicial use of the more onerous device of remanding with
procedural requirements. Thus, before undertaking our discussion
of whether the pragmatic justification for ordering hybrid rulemak-
ing is well founded in reality, it is necessary to seek to define the
circumstances under which the other devices serving the same goal
may be more appropriate.
1. Trial De Novo in Court. The APA evidences a Congres-
sional assumption that judicial trial de novo will be appropriate in
some circumstances, but it does not state what those circumstances
may be. Section 706(2) provides that the reviewing court shall "hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be. . . (F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the
facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court."
Two recent Supreme Court opinions have given section
706(2)(F) a rather narrow reading-a reading largely at odds with
the statutory history. In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc., v.
Volpe,6" the petitioners challenged a decision by the Secretary of
Transportation that there was "no feasible and prudent alternative"
to the use of some Memphis parkland for highway construction."
11 See text and notes at notes 215-17 infra for a discussion of the problem of finding a
basis for district court jurisdiction for this purpose.
6s SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 93-94 (1943).
69 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
70 That finding was a prerequisite to the use of federal funds for the highway. Transporta-
tion Act of 1966 § 4(f), 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970); Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968 § 18(a),
23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970).
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The Court expressly rejected the plaintiffs' claim of a right to trial
de novo:
Petitioners' alternative argument also fails. De novo re-
view of whether the Secretary's decision was "unwarranted by
the facts" is authorized by § 706(2)(F) in only two circumstan-
ces. First, such de novo review is authorized when the action
is adjudicatory in nature and the agency factfinding procedures
are inadequate. And, there may be independent judicial fact-
finding when issues that were not before the agency are raised
in a proceeding to enforce nonadjudicatory agency action. H.R.
Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. Neither situation exists
here .71
The Court instead ordered a remand to the district court "for plen-
ary review of the Secretary's decision," a review that might "require
the administrative officials who participated in the decision to give
testimony explaining their action. ' 7 Camp v. Pitts73 took a similar
view of section 706(2)(F). An applicant for a charter authorizing a
new bank74 challenged the Comptroller of the Currency's denial of
the application. The Court held that the district court's holding of
trial de novo on the merits was error, and ordered the case remanded
for an inquiry of the type prescribed by Overton Park.
75
The Overton Park Court's citation to the House Judiciary Com-
mittee report on the APA is curious. The report had summarized the
meaning of section 706(2)(F) in this way:
In short, where a rule or order is not required by statute to be
made after opportunity for agency hearing and to be reviewed
solely upon the record thereof, the facts pertinent to any rele-
vant question of law must be tried and determined de novo by
the reviewing court respecting either the validity or application
of such rule or order-because facts necessary to the determi-
nation of any relevant question of law must be determined of
record somewhere and, if Congress has not provided that an
agency shall do so, then the record must be made in court. 76
7, 401 U.S. at 415.
72 Id. at 420.
7411 U.S. 138 (1973).
See 12 U.S.C. § 27 (1970).
7' 411 U.S. at 141-43.
T' The remainder of the paragraph dealing with section 706(2)(F) was as follows:
The sixth category, respecting the establishment of facts upon trial de novo, would
require the reviewing court to determine the facts in any case of adjudication not subject
to sections 7 and 8 or otherwise required to be reviewed exclusively on the record of a
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The Committee thus apparently assumed that judicial trial de novo
might be an appropriate device when the substantive validity of an
agency rule turned upon the resolution of some factual claim.77
The Overton Park Court appears to have taken one of the
Committee's illustrations and used it to illustrate a completely dif-
ferent rule. The Committee had said: "Where a court enforces or
applies an administrative rule, the party to whom it is applied may
for example offer evidence and show the facts upon which he bases
a contention that he is not subject to the terms of the rule."7 Be-
cause such cases normally involve facts unique to the subject of the
enforcement proceeding, they do appear to fit within the Court's
second category-instances "when issues that were not before the
agency are raised in a proceeding to enforce nonadjudicatory agency
action. ' 79 But the passage as a whole rebuts any notion that the
statutory agency hearing. It would also require the judicial determination of facts in
connection with rulemaking or any other conceivable form of agency action to the extent
that the facts were relevant to any pertinent issues of law presented. For example,
statutes providing for "reparation orders," in which agencies determine damages and
award money judgments, usually state that the money orders issued are merely prima
facie evidence in the courts and the parties subject to them are permitted to introduce
evidence in the court in which the enforcement action is pending. In other cases, the test
is whether there has been a statutory administrative hearing of the facts which is ade-
quate and exclusive for purposes of review. Thus, adjudications such as tax assessments
not made upon a statutory administrative hearing and record may involve a trial of the
facts in The Tax Court or the United States district courts. Where administrative agen-
cies deny parties money to which they are entitled by statute or rule, the claimants may
sue as for any other claim and in so doing try out the facts in the Court of Claims or
United States district courts as the case may be. Where a court enforces or applies an
administrative rule, the party to whom it is applied may for example offer evidence and
show the facts upon which he bases a contention that he is not subject to the terms of
the rule. Where for example an affected party claims in a judicial proceeding that a rule
issued without an administrative hearing (and not required to be issued after such
hearing) is invalid for some relevant reason of law, he may show the facts upon which
he predicates such invalidity. In short, . . . [etc.]
SENATE COMMrITEE ON THE JUDicIARY, ADMINISTRATIVE PROcEDURE AcT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. 279 (1946) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY], quoting H.R. REP.
No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946). The paragraph alludes to the "sixth category" because
it was APA section 10(e)(6) that became 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F) (1970).
'I The Committee evidently assumed that the occasion for trial de novo would be an
enforcement proceeding. But to the extent that modern concepts of ripeness have accelerated
judicial determination of a rule's validity, one would expect that the trial contemplated by
the Committee would frequently be accelerated also. See also text and notes at notes 218-19
infra.
Note that in the Committee's reference to "a rule issued without an administrative
hearing," the word "hearing" must mean something more than a proceeding under section
553, for the simple reason that under the APA there is practically no rule that can be issued
at all without at least a section 553 proceeding. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (1970).
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 280.
7' 401 U.S. at 415.
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example was intended to delimit the scope of trial de novo outside
the adjudicatory context. The Senate Judiciary Committee report,
with a few differences in wording, is similarly broad."
Earlier statutory history of the APA mentions a concrete exam-
ple of how trial de novo can supply the factual predicate of rules
promulgated without a hearing. The Attorney General's Committee
on Administrative Procedure, appointed in 1939 to inquire into ex-
isting administrative practices and procedures, alluded in its final
report8 to Houston v. St. Louis Independent Packing Co.,82 a Su-
preme Court case involving sausage-labeling rules of the Secretary
of Agriculture. Congress had authorized the Secretary to issue rules
implementing the statutory prohibition of interstate sale of meat
under "any false or deceptive name." The Secretary thereupon
banned the interstate sale of sausage containing more than two
percent cereal, and a sausage manufacturer filed a bill in equity to
challenge the decision. The district court held "an elaborate trial"
to investigate the typical contents of "sausage" and the public's
knowledge about the true contents of so-called "sausage."83 Having
upheld this procedure, the Supreme Court seems to have accepted,
at least by implication, the principle of holding such a trial de novo
in review of nonrecord rulemaking. 4
De novo review of this sort is, of course, entirely different from
the theories of "jurisdictional fact"85 or "constitutional fact.""
Under those doctrines, the Court has ordered judicial trial de novo,
or at least a very broad scope of judicial review, over certain special
11 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 214, quoting S. REP. No. 572, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
The Attorney General's Manual argued for a narrow interpretation of section 10(e)(6),
but did so only in the context of review of agency adjudications, as opposed to instances where
a party draws in question the validity of a rule promulgated under section 553. ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S MANUAL 109-10.
1 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMrITEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE PRO-
CEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 116 (1941).
92 249 U.S. 479 (1919).
Id. at 484-85.
" When judicial review is to take place in the court of appeals rather than the district
court, trial de novo is still possible. Sometimes, the court of appeals is authorized to transfer
the case to the district court under the Administrative Orders Review Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2347
(1970). Moreover, although it is inconvenient, the court of appeals has the capacity to receive
oral testimony, see, e.g., NLRB v. Lambert, 250 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1958), or to refer the matter
to a master, see, e.g., NLRB v. Little Rock Furniture Mfg. Co., 123 F.2d 868 (8th Cir. 1941);
NLRB v. Giannasca, 119 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1941). See generally Currie & Goodman, Judicial
Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
1 (1975).
See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
" See St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936); Ohio Valley
Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920).
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issues-notwithstanding that those issues have already been re-
solved by the relevant agencies in adjudicatory hearings whose pro-
cedural validity the Court assumed. The theory of the House and
Senate Judiciary committees differs in at least two crucial respects.
First, by hypothesis the procedure they envisioned is limited to
cases where the objecting party has not had an opportunity to build
a trial-type record in support of his factual contentions. Second, the
procedure is consistent with a narrow standard of review. Thus,
assuming that "arbitrary or capricious" defines the scope of review
of our hypothetical primary' ambient air standard,87 and that the
EPA must therefore show only a fairly tenuous link between the
disputed pollutant and the public's health, the House and Senate
committees' view would support judicial trial de novo to ascertain
whether even that tenuous link exists.
Despite the apparent rarity of judicial trial de novo in these
circumstances, its propriety is demonstrated by the existence of an
analogous practice: judicial trial of facts that are necessary to deter-
mine the constitutional validity of statutes. Recently, for example,
in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFeur,8 the Supreme Court
upset school rules requiring pregnant teachers to quit in the fourth
or fifth month of pregnancy. In doing so, the Court relied on evi-
dence developed at trial below that there were "large numbers of
teachers who are fully capable of continuing work for longer" than
the school rules permitted.89 On several other occasions, the Court
has remanded a case to the trial court to develop a factual record
sufficient for a decision on constitutional validity. In Borden's Farm
Products Co. v. Baldwin,9" for instance, a milk dealer challenged, on
due process and equal protection grounds, a statute requiring a state
milk control board, in its setting of minimum milk prices, to allow
dealers without a "well-advertised trade name" a one-cent down-
ward leeway. The Court remanded for trial to determine whether,
as the state contended, the statute preserved preexisting competi-
tive relationships.
It seems that a device that can be employed (where necessary)
to verify the factual underpinnings of legislation is equally appropri-
ate for a court that wants to verify the factual support of agency
8, See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
88 414 U.S. 632 (1974). See generally Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional
Litigation, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 75.
"0 414 U.S. at 646.
,0 293 U.S. 194 (1934).
" Id. at 207-13. See also cases cited in id. at 211-13; Note, The Presentation of Facts
Underlying the Constitutionality of Statutes, 49 HARv. L. REV. 631 (1936).
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rules, when the agency's factual record comes from the so-called
"legislative" hearing under section 553. Neither "separation of pow-
ers" nor any other doctrine provides a distinction that would make
"statutory facts"-facts needed to ascertain whether an agency's
regulation is within its statutory power-any more immune to judi-
cial resolution than facts necessary to ascertain whether a statute
is within the legislature's constitutional power.92
Do the Supreme Court opinions in Overton Park and Camp
represent authoritative rejections of this viewpoint? Although the
above-cited dicta certainly invite that conclusion, the holdings can
clearly be reconciled with the view of the two Judiciary Committees.
The mere existence of a state of facts that would support an admin-
istrative order is not a sufficient basis for upholding the order if
there is no reason to believe the agency relied on those facts. As
Justice Frankfurter observed in Chenery I:
Judged, therefore, as a determination based upon judge-
made rules of equity, the Commission's order cannot be up-
held. Its action must be measured by what the Commission
did, not by what it might have done. It is not for us to deter-
mine independently what is "detrimental to the public interest
or the interest of investors or consumers" or "fair or equitable"
within the meaning of § § 7 and 11 of the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935. The Commission's action cannot be up-
held merely because findings might have been made and con-
siderations disclosed which would justify its order as an appro-
priate safeguard for the interests protected by the Act. There
must be such a responsible finding. . . . There is no such find-
ing here. 3
In contexts such as Overton Park and Camp, therefore, where the
Court has decided that the agency is not bound to state findings of
fact and reasons, it may make sense to direct the lower courts to
inquire first into the mental process of the administrator, since only
factual support discovered there would sustain his action. Once it
has been determined what his factual premises were, however, it
should still be open to objecting parties to show, in a proper case,
92 Cf. A Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 460 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1971), where the court
of appeals remanded for a trial to determine whether, as against a first amendment challenge,
certain Department of Interior regulations restricting the use of Lafayette Park in Washing-
ton, D.C., could be justified as essential to the protection of the President.
,3 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 93-94 (1943). But see Colorado Interstate Gas Co.
v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581 (1945). See also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947);
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1962).
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that those premises are without adequate basis in reality. At this
later stage, trial de novo as contemplated by the House and Senate
Judiciary committees would seem to be one of the reviewing court's
options.
But it may also be asked whether a remand to the agency in-
stead of to a court (in other words, hybrid rulemaking) should be
preferred. The most pervasive principle of administrative law-the
court's duty to preserve agency autonomy to the maximum extent
consistent with performing the functions of judicial review" 4-seems
to call for an affirmative answer. The agency's expertise in the rele-
vant substantive area obviously suggests the desirability of that
course (although this factor may at times be offset by the agency's
lack of experience in holding trial-type hearings) . 5 Moreover, in the
normal case it will be the agency's duty to take whatever factual
conclusions emerge from testimony under cross-examination, pull
them together with any other adequately supported factual find-
ings, and transform them into a rule within the guidelines of its
statutory mandate. For the court to take over a segment of the fact-
finding would truncate the decision-making process. 6
In sum, the power to conduct substantive review seems to carry
with it an implied power to conduct a judicial trial de novo-and,
a fortiori, a power to remand to the agency with instructions to
conduct a hearing whose procedures will be adequate to assure the
necessary airing of the underlying factual claims. Indeed, the de
novo trial power should be sparingly exercised, because of the
agency autonomy principle.
2. Remand for Clarification. The availability of this device is,
particularly since Chenery I, unquestioned. The problem is whether
it will afford any benefit to the challenging party. If the agency is
in a position to accept the challenger's view of the facts, yet arrive
at its original conclusion by articulating a new value judgment that
was always within its power, a remand of this sort may moot the
factual controversy. Alternatively, a remand requiring the agency to
respond to detailed factual criticism may lead it to produce reports
of experiments and tests that reduce to relative insignificance the
critic's attacks on the perceptions relied on in the original proceed-
' Cf. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 425 (1965) (discussing ex-
haustion).
"5 Note the House Judiciary Committee's unexplained assumption (see text at note 76
supra) that no agency forum would be available for formal fact-finding.
" See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 227 (1943); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938); L. JAFFE, supra note 94, at 425.
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ing.97 On the other hand, in some instances, such a remand may
bring the factual dispute into sharper focus, but not resolve it. Then
the court will still be unable to fulfill its duty of substantive review
of the rule itself.
In conclusion, courts have several devices at hand for occasions
when unresolved factual issues make it impossible for them to re-
view the substance of any agency rule. The judicial trial de novo and
the remand for clarification both have roles to play. But courts will
sometimes find the former too intrusive and the latter too lax, and
will have to consider whether hybrid rulemaking can effectively
serve their needs. A look at the cases and their history on remand
will provide the background for an empirical discussion of that
problem.
mII. THE HYBRID RULEMAKING CASES: A REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS
In this section, our study of the cases begins with a survey of
how each defendant agency has responded to the decisions, both in
the particular disputes occasioning the remand and in the agency's
general methods of operation. The next sections use that data to
draw inferences about the efficacy of the judicially imposed proce-
dures, namely, (a) the qualified right of cross-examination, and (b)
the right to an adequate opportunity to comprehend-and thus to
reply to-the data and reasoning relied upon by the agency. Conse-
quently, this section discusses the cases agency-by-agency, and the
next sections address them procedure-by-procedure.
A. Department of Agriculture
The impact of Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin98 on the Depart-
ment of Agriculture can fairly be described as modest. The Depart-
ment's stance is based on a restrictive interpretation of the way that
the case relates to the distinctive procedures of commodity market-
ing regulation; implicitly, perhaps, it is also based on a conclusion
that the teachings of the case are of little general use to the Depart-
ment.
The regulatory context is as follows: section 8c of the Agricul-
tural Marketing Agreement Act of 193711 (the "Marketing Act")
authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to issue marketing orders
governing the sale of specified commodities in order to maintain the
17 Cf. note 192 infra.
' 449 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
g 7 U.S.C. § 608c (1970), as amended, 7 U.S.C.A. § 608c (Supp. 1974).
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prices received by farmers. The statute requires "due notice of an
opportunity for a hearing" ' as a condition of each order and any
amendments to such orders. 01 The Department has implemented
the statute's hearing requirement by issuing regulations providing
for procedures that closely resemble a full adversary hearing,' 2 in-
cluding a right to cross-examination. 03
Pursuant to these procedures, the Secretary promulgated a
marketing order for tomatoes grown in Florida (the "Tomato Mar-
keting Order").'0 4 The order itself provided that the Secretary
should issue so-called "regulations" to implement the order,' 5 but
it did not prescribe hearings for that purpose. Thus, the Secretary
had established a structure which, although idiosyncratic in its
nomenclature, arguably conformed to the statutory requirements:
major decisions would be made after full notice and hearing, and
would result in an amendment to the Tomato Marketing Order;
relatively minor implementing decisions, called "regulations",
would be made without a formal hearing in accordance with current
data about tomato production and prices.
In 1955 the Secretary amended the Tomato Marketing Order,
after notice and hearing, to authorize the issuance of regulations
that would "[1]imit the handling of tomatoes by establishing, in
terms of grades, sizes, or both, minimum standards of quality and
maturity."'' Then, on several occasions during 1970, he issued regu-
lations that not only limited marketing by sizes, but also created
size differentials between "vine ripe" tomatoes and "mature green"
tomatoes. Specifically, the regulations gave "mature greens" a -
inch advantage: the sale of "vine ripes" was prohibited if they were
less than or equal to 2 17/32 inches in diameter; "mature greens,"
on the other hand, could be sold as long as they exceeded 2 9/32
inches.'07
Plaintiffs, importers of Mexican tomatoes to whom the restric-
tions were also applicable,"18 complained that the theory on which
the differential was purportedly based-namely, that it would
1' Id. §§ 608c(3)-(4).
1*1 Id. § 608c(17) (1970), as amended, 7 U.S.C.A. § 608c(17) (Supp. 1974).
1- 7 C.F.R. Part 900 (1975).
'3 Id. § 900.8(d). In practice, a witness is evidently permitted to limit his own cross-
examination by refusing to answer questions he regards as irrelevant, personal, or repetitious.
See Hamilton, supra note 40, at 1296.
" 7 C.F.R. Part 966 (1975).
i Id. § 966.50-.56 (1975).
' 449 F.2d at 1013-14.
107 Id. at 1013.
'o' See 7 U.S.C. § 608e-1 (1970), as amended, (Supp. 1971).
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equalize the burden of the restrictions among different classes of
Florida growers-was unfounded in fact; that the differential im-
posed a discriminatory burden upon Mexican tomatoes and had
been intended to do so; and that the statute precluded such a pur-
pose. They also alleged that in view of the vague language of the
1955 amendment and the differences in circumstances since 1955,
the Secretary should have permitted a hearing on the decision to
impose differential size restrictions. The court of appeals decision,
written by Judge Leventhal, ordered the district court to issue a
declaratory judgment that plaintiffs were entitled to hearings, with
some right of cross-examination, on "crucial" issues involved in
tomato marketing control. After the decision, the Department held
a five-week hearing featuring extensive cross-examination, and then
reaffirmed its earlier decision.109 Parties disappointed by the deci-
sion are pressing for review of the regulation, on a wide variety of
grounds.110
It is possible to construe the opinion as simply an interpretation
of section 8c of the Marketing Act. Since that statute requires "no-
tice" and "hearing" before issuance or amendment of a marketing
order, the opinion might mean that an issue such as the 1-inch
differential can only be decided as part of the issuance or amend-
ment of a marketing order, pursuant to the "hearing" mentioned in
the Marketing Act. In this view, the decision has precedential effect
only for other section 8c cases. But the opinion also invites a broader
interpretation. Its tone, its lack of reliance on statutory history, and
its focus on the nature of the decision-making process, the risks of
industry domination, and the demands of basic fairness-all sug-
gest that the decision was intended to reach further.
These broader possibilities of the case have had no perceptible
impact at the Department of Agriculture: there have evidently been
no similar claims for a hearing with rights of cross-examination; '
nor has the existence of the case prompted the Department to offer
such hearings in any other instances where it previously would not
have done So. 1 12 The Department views the case as, at most, a
correction of its momentary lapse from the principle that hearings
See 37 Fed. Reg. 17479 (1972).
"' See Coast Marketing Co. v. Butz, Civ. No. 2154-72 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 27, 1972);
Consumers Union v. Butz, Civ. No. 2142-72 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 26, 1972).
"I Interview with R. Stanley Harsh, Deputy General Counsel, Department of Agricul-
ture, in Washington, D.C., Aug. 22, 1974.
112 Id.
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are available on issues of the sort that were at stake in Walter
Holm. 113
B. Federal Power Commission
Nor have the hybrid rulemaking cases had any drastic impact
upon the FPC. The two controversies in which the Commission was
itself involved have not, as yet, involved any further agency pro-
ceedings. If the cases have had any other impact upon the Commis-
sion's behavior, the effects are subtle and apparently not onerous.
Prior to the rulemaking involved in Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC,"4
the Commission, in setting rates for transportation of natural gas,
had customarily allocated to liquid and liquifiable hydrocarbon
rates some portion of the pipeline's total costs. The allocation was
independent of what the pipelines actually charged for transporta-
tion. The purpose behind this practice was to make sure that con-
sumers of natural gas were not burdened with those costs. In Febru-
ary of 1968, the Commission issued a notice of proposed rulemaking,
in which it declared that it was "contemplating adopting a state-
ment of general policy" ' and then set forth the "general policy" in
terms of suggesting a continuation of its existing practice. After a
series of meetings with some of the interested parties, but without
any hint that it proposed to set minimum rates for liquids and
liquifiables in that very proceeding, the FPC issued an order doing
just that. '
On review, the court first undermined one of the substantive
premises of the order by holding that the Commission had no juris-
diction to set rates for liquid hydrocarbons.' The court then re-
versed the FPC order as to liquifiables, because the Commission had
allowed the original proceeding "to slide over into a proceeding
fixing specific mandatory rates in which the required procedures,
beginning with the notice of what was to be ultimately done by the
Commission, were inadequate.' '1 8 While declining to find FPC rate-
113 Id.
11 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
,,5 See 33 Fed. Reg. 2860 (1968). See also 483 F.2d at 1243.
", Order Establishing Charges for Transporting Liquids and Liquifiable Hydrocarbons,
FPC Order No. 449, 37 Fed. Reg. 2954, 2957 (1972). Evidently, the justification for setting
minimum prices, as opposed to merely making an accounting allocation, was that shippers
of liquids and liquifiables would otherwise be able to use their market power to force the
pipelines to agree to ship at lower rates; if this occurred, the FPC would have to raise
transportation rates for natural gas in order to avoid impairing the financial position of the
pipeline companies.
"z 483 F.2d at 1246-49.
"s Id. at 1263.
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making governed by the formal rulemaking standards of sections
556 and 557, the court concluded that the procedures of section 553
alone were insufficient. It held that, because the Natural Gas Act
made "substantial evidence" a prerequisite to judicial approval of
the Commission's ratemaking decisions, the Commission must per-
mit a "testing" of its evidence "by procedures sufficiently adversary
in nature to provide a reasonable guarantee of its reliability.""' The
procedures were to include either cross-examination or some effec-
tive substitute, such as written questions to be answered either in
writing or orally.'20 Although the court of appeals, speaking through
Judge Wilkey, relied heavily on the Natural Gas Act's requirements
of substantial evidence and of a "record,' 2' 1 some of its language-
particularly that alluding to the need for a factual record that would
make judicial review possible2'2-seems applicable in any rulemak-
ing case.
Since the decision, the FPC has, in its effort to prevent the costs
of transporting liquids and liquifiables from burdening natural gas
consumers, simply relied on its prior practice."13 It has not decided
whether to resume the effort to set minimum rates for liquifiables.
The Commission's General Counsel and Solicitor maintain that the
procedural duties imposed by the court in Mobil Oil are essentially
irrelevant both to the Commission's hesitation and to the ultimate
decision on whether or not minimum rates should be pursued. 14
Their view stems primarily from doubts that the technique the
Commission employed in Mobil Oil was a genuine improvement
over the existing practice anyway, and in part from a later decision
of the District of Columbia Circuit, American Public Gas Associa-
tion v. FPC (APGA),In which in the opinion of the FPC has sharply
limited Mobil Oil.
The second case involving the FPC, Public Service
Commission,121 has also failed to result in any further FPC action.
The case involved area ratemaking for the Texas Gulf Area, pur-
suant to the Supreme Court's approval of area ratemaking in the
,, Id. at 1264.
Id. at 1263.
12 Id. at 1257-64.
'2 Id. at 1262.
'12 Interviews with Leo F. Forquer, General Counsel, and George W. McHenry, Jr., Solic-
itor, at Washington, D.C., Aug. 19, 1974.
124 Id.
1- 498 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See text and notes at notes 142-47 infra.
12' Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 487 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded,
417 U.S. 964 (1974).
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Permian Basin Area Rate Cases. 12 7 The Commission had established
base rates and special provisions-"contingent escalations" and
"refund work-offs"-purportedly designed to provide natural gas
producers with additional incentives to explore and extract. 18 The
Commission relied upon the record in another area ratemaking pro-
ceeding, Southern Louisiana II, 129 as a source of factual support for
the special provisions.
The court of appeals unanimously held that this reliance was
improper "due to the lack of opportunity given to petitioners to
respond to the incorporation of that record."' 30 Again speaking
through Judge Leventhal, the court underlined the potential signifi-
cance of this lost opportunity by pointing to a series of claims by
the challengers to which the FPC had made no response. 3'
As a legal basis for its conclusion, the court alluded to the
statutory requirement of substantial evidence in the record,'32 but
its more fundamental premise appeared to be that the Commission
had "not been responsive to petitioners' challenges to the incentive
provisions of its rate order, and our judicial review function is
thereby hampered."' The decision was placed on grounds quite
independent of the issue of how the ratemaking should be classified
within APA categories; it so happened that the FPC had treated the
matter as "formal" rulemaking, taking over 25,000 pages of testi-
mony. 34 Two members of the panel, Chief Judge Bazelon and Judge
Richey, found the principle of the decision also applicable to the
FPC's computation of base rates, saying that the Commission had
failed to provide a "reasoned justification" of its solution, and had
thereby made it "impossible for the parties to confront and chal-
lenge the bases for its actions."'' 3 They, too, stressed that a better
record would be necessary if judicial review was to be more than "a
formal rite of passage.""16
' 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
' For a discussion of the development of and statutory authority for the refund credit
incentive, see Comment, Refund Beneficiaries and Refund Credits Under the Natural Gas
Act, 41 U. CHI. L. R~v. 792, 807-13 (1974).
"I See Area Rate Proceeding (Southern Louisiana Area I), 46 F.P.C. 86, aff'd sub. nom.,
Placid Oil Co. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd sub. nom., Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC,
417 U.S. 283 (1974).
487 F.2d at 1071.
Id. at 1071-79.
" Id. at 1069.
"1 Id. at 1080.
" See Area Rate Proceeding (Texas Gulf Coast Area), 45 F.P.C. 674, 680 (1971).
' 487 F.2d at 1098.
136 Id. at 1099.
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Two Supreme Court decisions, and the passage of time, have
rendered the case academic. In its review of the Southern Louisiana
H rate proceeding,3 1 the Court in essence approved the base rate
and special incentive devices that had been at issue in the Texas
Gulf decision.'38 This outcome alone would have suggested that any
remand to the Commission, for the sort of procedure and articula-
tion originally required by the court of appeals, would have had
little effect. Moreover, the Supreme Court then vacated the judg-
ment of the court of appeals in Public Service Commission and
remanded the case to it for reconsideration in light of Southern
Louisiana II.'I On reconsideration, the court of appeals denied the
petitions for review. It relied largely on the circumstance that devel-
opments in the natural gas industry, such as the failure of natural
gas dedications to reach the level necessary to trigger the special
incentive provisions, had emptied the case of virtually all practical
significance.'
Looking beyond the Mobil Oil and Public Service Commission
controversies themselves, one can find little discernible impact at
the FPC. For instance, in the Commission's most gigantic recent
proceeding-the setting of national rates for certain natural gas
sales-some of the parties demanded more elaborate procedures,
citing Mobil Oil, and the Commission responded:
We believe that any question as to the adequacy of the
procedures followed in this case that may have been raised by
the Mobil Oil decision where [sic] laid to rest by the subse-
quent decision of the Supreme Court not to review the Phillips
decision [in which the Tenth Circuit had approved the use of
section 553 rulemaking for the purposes of the FPC's area rate-
making proceedings]," Moreover, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit has distinguished its holding in
the Mobil Oil case in its holding that the Commission has
the authority to establish initial rates by the use of rule-
making procedures. American Public Gas Association, et al. v.
FPC.... 42
13' Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 417 U.S. 283 (1974).
W In regard to base rates, compare 487 F.2d at 1097-99, with 417 U.S. at 315-21; in regard
to contingent escalations, compare 487 F.2d at 1068-77, with 417 U.S. at 321-27; in regard to
refund work-offs, compare 487 F.2d at 1077-79, with 417 U.S. at 321-27.
' FPC v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 417 U.S. 964 (1974).
" Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 516 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
" Phillips Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 475 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1146 (1974).
"I FPC Op. No. 699, Dkt. No. R-389-B, Opinion and Order Prescribing Uniform National
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The Commission went on to cite the elements in Mobil Oil that the
APGA court had relied on in distinguishing that case-the FPC's
inadequate notice and its reliance on rather informal conference
procedures.13
The quoted passage does not fully convey the Commission's
concern about compliance with the basic thrust of the opinions in
Mobil Oil and Public Service Commission. At other points in its
national ratemaking opinion, the FPC stressed that its procedure
permitted a meaningful dialogue between the parties and the Com-
mission,' and that none of the parties claiming a right to cross-
examine had identified any issues requiring cross.'
The FPC's broader objectives may explain its long-run reaction
to the two decisions. It has only recently embarked on the drastic
step of abandoning its tedious procedures for ratemaking by means
of formal rulemaking, in favor of section 553 procedures. The step
received judicial sanction in Phillips and APGA, but in both cases
the Commission's victory fell short of a carte blanche. In Phillips,
the ratemaking had not yet taken place, and the court noted its
power "to remand the cause to the agency for further delineation,
information, or expression of views." '' In APGA, the court stressed
that the Commission had provided all parties with an opportunity
to criticize and analyze all the data and submissions on which it had
relied; the court also emphasized the protesting parties' failure to
identify any issues that could be explored more successfully by
cross-examination than by the procedure actually employed.14 7
Thus, it is hardly surprising that the Commission has been able to
take Public Service Commission and Mobil Oil in its stride. Provid-
ing parties advance access to its data and theories is a far less
burdensome alternative than the procedures from whose tangles it
appears to be escaping-including the virtually automatic right of
all parties to engage in cross-examination.
Rate for Sales of Natural Gas Produced from Wells Commenced on or After January 1, 1973,
and New Dedications of Natural Gas to Interstate Commerce on or After January 1, 1973, at
11 (June 21, 1974).
"4 Id.; see APGA, 498 F.2d at 723.
-4 "... [Eivery ,party has been given an opportunity to submit two sets of responses
and replies to the responses of all other parties. Thus, no party can be heard to complain that
he lacked an adequate opportunity to develop his case before the Commission." FPC Op. No.
699, supra note 142, at 14.
" "No party has pointed out any specific questions or issues that it would raise upon
oral cross examination or why it could not adequately 'test, criticize, and illuminate the flaws
in the evidentiary basis being advanced regarding a particular point' by other parties in its
own written submissions. (See Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC .... )." Id. at 12.
'" 475 F.2d at 850.
", 498 F.2d at 723.
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C. Environmental Protection Agency
Of the agencies examined here, the EPA has made the most
self-conscious effort to apply in new contexts the lessons of the
hybrid rulemaking cases to which it has been a party: International
Harvester, 8 Appalachian Power,'4' and Portland Cement."'5 Its re-
actions are discussed in detail in the next section of this article. This
section is limited to a resume of the EPA cases and their post-
remand history, together with a brief listing of the techniques
adopted by the EPA in its effort at compliance.
In International Harvester, the EPA had denied the auto com-
panies' applications, under the Clean Air Act of 1970, for one-year
deferrals of the effective date of 1975 emissions standards.'5 ' In re-
manding, the court of appeals imposed upon the EPA two proce-
dural requirements: to permit "some opportunity for cross-
examination," which the agency could confine "to the essentials,
avoiding discursive or repetitive questioning";'52 and to provide the
parties an "opportunity on remand to address themselves to matters
not previously put before them by EPA for comment, including
material contained in the Technical Appendix filed by the EPA in
1972 subsequent to its [original] Decision.""'
Again Judge Leventhal's opinion alluded to a statutory basis-
here, the Clean Air Act's requirement of a "public hearing."" 4 But
he invoked that requirement only in passing as a basis for the lim-
ited right of cross-examination and not at all as a basis for the
broader right to see and challenge the critical steps of the EPA
reasoning process. Against a background suggesting that the social
costs of an erroneous refusal to suspend might be calamitous,"' and
the court's clear feeling that the automobile companies had raised
substantial doubts about the validity of the EPA's factual predic-
tions,"' the court clearly put primary emphasis on its inability to
' International Harvester Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
"' Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973).
'" Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 921 (1974).
'' See 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-l(b) (5) (1970). Since the statute seemingly permitted reappli-
cation after denial, there might have been a second hearing even in the absence of a remand.
One might even speculate that the EPA was putting maximum feasible pressure on the auto
companies by denying the first application while anticipating that it might later reverse itself.
1 478 F.2d at 649. See also id. at 630-31.
'1 Id. at 649.
, Id. at 629-31.
, Id. at 636-38, 641.
' Id. at 642-47.
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afford meaningful review if either right were denied.'57
On remand, the agency substantially modified its decision,
making it in many respects more lenient to the auto manufactur-
ers.158 So far as cross-examination was concerned, the mandate of
the court proved a shaggy dog story. Chrysler, which had vocifer-
ously insisted on the need to cross-examine, never once requested
an opportunity to do so. And although Ford requested an opportun-
tiy to cross-examine the EPA staff members who had devised the
methodology for the remand, 5 ' it accepted the EPA's alternative
offer of an off-the-record conference with those staff members. The
EPA also furnished the auto companies with a fairly elaborate ad-
vance written statement of its proposed methodology.
The decision of the Fourth Circuit in Appalachian Power-the
only one of these decisions rendered by a court other than the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit-involved similar procedural commands.
At issue was the EPA's approval, under section 110 of the Clean Air
Act, '0 of "state implementation plans" for bringing ambient air
pollution levels down to those prescribed by the Administrator
under section 109 of the Act."1 Since the statute required each state
to hold a hearing before adopting a plan,"2 the court of appeals held
that an EPA hearing could be dispensed with if, but only if, the
state hearing had been "adequate.' 1 3 The court's concept of ade-
quacy was expressed rather vaguely:
What is required in all instances, whatever the character of the
administrative action, is "the reality of an opportunity to sub-
mit an effective presentation," and, if in the context of the
issues involved, "cross-examination on the crucial issues" is
found proper, such right should be recognized and upheld.
Walter Holm & Company v. Hardin .... "4
Again, one may summarize the case as requiring both a contingent
right of cross-examination (though what it is contingent upon is
obscure), and some opportunity for an effective challenge to the
EPA's approach. To reach that result the Fourth Circuit relied nei-
... Id. at 632, 649.
38 Fed. Reg. 10317 (1973).
, ' Hearings on Applications for One-Year Suspension of the 1975 Motor Vehicle Emis-
sions Standards 2182-86 [hereinafter cited as Emissions Suspension Remand Hearings].
'do 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970).
Jai Id. § 1857c-4.
262 Id. § 1857c-5(a)(1).
26 477 F.2d at 502.
"4 Id. at 503.
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ther on APA classifications nor the substantive statute, but upon
the necessities of judicial review." 5 The court additionally alluded
to due process considerations, 6 but did not reveal just how the
constitutional argument would run.
As was true in International Harvester, the contingent right to
cross-examination was not exercised. Although the state hearings
had not involved opportunity to cross-examine, 16 7 the litigation con-
cerning the implementation plans of West Virginia and Maryland 6"
was resolved by agreements under which the companies abandoned
any claim to cross-examination. Instead the parties agreed that
EPA would furnish a written response to each of the critiques made
by the companies, to be followed by an opportunity for the compa-
nies to respond to the EPA response; and the companies would
retain an option to call an off-the-record or on-the-record technical
conference with the EPA.1 6
The mandate in Portland Cement is, of all the hybrid rulemak-
ing cases the least detailed in its procedural prescription. Indeed,
the court articulated its procedural demands as a functional appen-
dage to its analysis of the challenger's substantive attacks on the
agency's rule, which imposed air pollution performance standards
on newly constructed Portland cement plants. After a discussion
devoted principally to the challenger's factual contentions, the
court declared: "This record reveals a lack of an adequate opportun-
ity of the manufacturers to comment on the proposed standards,
due to the absence of disclosure of the detailed findings and proce-
dures of the tests.' 170
Again speaking through Judge Leventhal, the court of appeals
pointed to nothing in the substantive statute that might trigger any
particular procedures. Instead, the court invoked section 553 in a
footnote: "Written comments were submitted as requested, and as
"' Id. at 503-07. The court explicitly assumed that the scope of review was whether EPA's
action had been "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law." Id. at 506-07, quoting APA § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
', 477 F.2d at 503.
"' Interview with Theodore L. Garrett, an associate at Covington & Burling (Washing-
ton, D.C.), which is counsel for petitioners Appalachian Power Co., Duquesne Light Co. and
Ohio Power Co., at Washington, D.C., Aug. 20, 1974.
I" The other dispute in the case-concerning Virginia's implementation plan-was re-
solved without the adoption of any formal procedure for exploration of factual contentions.
Telephone interview with Neil T. Proto, attorney, Department of Justice, July 9, 1974.
"I See stipulation dated June 20, 1974, in Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, No. 72-1733
(4th Cir.); stipulation dated March 29, 1974, in Bethlehem Steel Co. v. EPA, No. 72-1776
(4th Cir.).
"tO 486 F.2d at 402. See also id. at 392-95, 393 n.67 (reflecting failure of prior, unreported
remand to cure problem of insufficient detail).
1975]
The University of Chicago Law Review
required by the APA § 4(c), 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). Obviously a prere-
quisite to the ability to make meaningful comment is to know the
basis upon which the rule is proposed."' 17 In the body of the opinion,
moreover, the court justified the remand by relying upon the need
for an adequate factual record that would enable it to discern
whether, in the language of Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc.
v. Volpe,172 "'the decision was based upon a consideration of the
relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judg-
ment.' ,,,73
The remand is complete, and the original rule, only slightly
modified, has been affirmed on appeal.1 74 The EPA produced a 58-
page draft response, articulating its methodology and endeavoring
to respond to critiques of the mnanufacturers that the court had
deemed worthy of answer. Voluminous further critiques and a final
EPA response followed. Although the challenger appealed, its brief
did not launch any serious attack on the technical conclusions that
had been the occasion of the remand.1 75
IV. THE UTILITY OF CROSS-EXAMINATION
Admittedly, it is impossible to discover exactly how much the
various procedural devices ordered in the hybrid rulemaking cases
have contributed to the elucidation of relevant issues. Even when
new light dawns during cross-examination, for example, one can
rarely say with confidence that some other procedure would not
have shed equivalent light. The converse is also true: if examination
fails to expose any material falsehood or inaccuracy, the reason may
be that fear of cross-examination has inhibited a falsehood, has
inspired exceptional caution, or has led to the witness's revealing on
direct what might have been elicited on cross. In the language of
social science, there is no "control group": no identical agency work-
ing on the same issue and following all the same procedures except
the one whose value is being tested.
Nonetheless, our limited sampling is in some respects sugges-
tive. Of the four cases in which some possibility of cross-
'7, Id. at 393 n.67.
17 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
486 F.2d at 402.
' Portland Cement Ass'n v. Train, 513 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
,7' Brief of Petitioner Following Remand, D.C. Cir. No. 72-1073. The EPA staff counsel
in charge of the matter believes that the remand not only produced a record that sufficiently
supported the agency's rule, but also had (in conjunction with the other hybrid rulemaking
cases) the long-term effect of inducing the EPA to base its rules on more adequate data.
Telephone interview with Richard Denny, May 28, 1975.
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examination seemed to be required (Walter Holm, International
Harvester, Appalachian Power, and Mobil Oil), Walter Holm is the
only one in which it has actually occurred. Some indication of the
role of cross-examination emerges from the challengers' brief and
proposed findings of fact in that dispute, wherein they rely upon
material brought out by cross-examination of witnesses who sup-
ported the proposed rule.
A. Cross-Examination and Methodological Disputes
By all odds the most dramatic instance of cross-examination
cited by the challengers in Walter Holm was Louis F. Rauth's, a
witness for the proponents of the -inch differential. A key theory
in support of the differential was that "vine ripe" tomatoes at the
time of picking are approximately -inch larger in diameter than
"mature greens" at the time of picking. Rauth testified to field
measurements of tomatoes which, he said, verified the differential.
He spoke vaguely of making the measurements with his thumb and
finger. 7' During cross-examination the witness revealed that he had
simply looked at the distance between his thumb and finger as they
grasped the tomato, first when it was a mature green, and then, a
week or so later, when he had returned to grasp the same tomato.
In other words, he had used no instrument for measuring but his
eyeball, and no method for recording the first measurement. Yet he
claimed to have measured a /-inch growth. 7
Had Rauth's "measurements" been the sole support for the
alleged -inch differential, his cross-examination would presuma-
bly have demolished the proponents' case. One could fairly say that
his testimony carried "its own death wound."' 78 In fact, however,
there was also substantial evidence of the more conventional statist-
ical type, and material elicited on cross-examination had only a
slight tendency to diminish the strength of that data.
The statistical evidence fell into two categories: formal reports
of scientific sampling by agricultural experts, and records of the
sizes of tomatoes actually shipped from Florida. Of the scientific
reports, one, made in 1920,111 indicated that Florida tomatoes dis-
played no growth in size worth mentioning in the last two weeks
'" Hearings With Respect to Proposed Amendment of Marketing Agreement and Order
[hereinafter cited as Tomato Remand Hearings] at 217-18.
7 Id. at 1654-55. Ironically enough, the pivotal questions were put by a representative
of the Department of Agriculture.
'7' See NLRB v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 337 U.S. 656, 660 (1949).
'" Tomato Remand Hearings, Exh. 30.
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before becoming "vine ripe." In the week immediately preceeding
that two week period, however, the tomatoes tested had shown an
average growth of nine millimeters in diameter, well over a quarter
of an inch. 8' Thus, the issue of whether the 1920 report sustains or
undermines the 1 -inch differential turns on the issue of how long
before becoming "vine ripe" (a status shown by even a slight
"blush" of pink on a tomato) mature green tomatoes are actually
picked. If, but only if, such tomatoes are characteristically picked
about three full weeks or longer before the "vine ripe" stage, the
report tends to prove that the 1/4-inch regulatory differential reflects
a 1 -inch real-world differential.
The evidence on harvesting times relied on by the opponents of
the rule consisted in part of statements by their own witnesses, but
also included testimony by Florida growers who supported the dif-
ferential. 81 A concession from opposing witnesses certainly cuts
more ice than the claims of one's own, so those concessions cannot
be dismissed as mere duplications of the challengers' own direct
evidence. Two circumstances suggest, however, that only limited
value can be assigned to the challengers' having had a chance to
cross-examine. First, the final decision was rendered by a Depart-
ment of Agriculture official who was not physically present at the
hearings; consequently, the concessions had no dramatic value so
far as the ultimate decision making was concerned. Second, there
seems no particular reason to suppose that well-drafted interrogato-
ries (had they been permitted) would not have achieved as much.
The inferences drawn from the 1944 study are largely indepen-
dent of any right of cross-examination. Although its methodology
was not clear, it found an increase in the last four days before "vine
ripe" status from 178.1 cubic centimeters to 193.4 cubic centime-
ters, or 8.59%.182 Well established principles of mathematics permit
one to convert a change in the volume of a sphere into the correspon-
ding change in its diameter.1 3 Cross-examination was hardly neces-
sary, therefore, to show which side the 1944 report helped. Nor does
Ia Id.
,' See id. at 47, 51, 1553, 2269, 3458.
,82 Although Exhibit 31, the 1944 report on tomatoes in Mississippi, speaks of measure-
ments in cubic centimeters, the Department of Agriculture decision suggests that they may
have been measurements of diameters. See 37 Fed. Reg. at 17482. How this could be so is
not immediately apparent.
11 V = 4/3 R3 (where V is volume and R is radius). Thus, an 8.59% increase in volume
equals a 2.8% increase in diameter; applied to a tomato of 2 9/32 inches in diameter, it would
mean an increase of about 2/32, or only of 1/4 of an inch. The mathematical implications
of a given increase in volume, for purposes of ascertaining changes in diameter, are omitted
from the Department of Agriculture decision. See id.
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it seem probable that cross-examination of those who prepared the
1944 study would have shed much light on the adequacy of its meth-
odology.
In terms of identifying methodological errors, it would seem
that the report's own omissions and revelations would provide a
record to which cross-examination could add relatively little, be-
cause detailed articulation of methodology is presumably a prere-
quisite to scholarly acceptability. And in terms of determining the
weight to be attached to methodological errors, although again con-
cessions from the study's own creators would perhaps be ideal, inter-
rogatories to the agency might achieve substantially similar im-
pact. 184
Further statistical evidence took the form of shipping data,
especially for mid-January through April 1971. Data relied on by the
Department showed that, as applied to vine ripes and mature greens
shipped in that period, a 5/32-inch differential would have resulted
in equality of withholding over that period.185 And once again, the
challengers' attack on the Department's inferences drew little sup-
port from the fruits of cross-examination: (1) they maintained that
the real issue was an 8/32-inch differential, the one recommended
by the Florida Tomato Committee8 ' and adopted by the Secre-
tary; 87 (2) they argued that equality of withholding between a "vine
ripe" segment and a "mature green" segment of the Florida indus-
try was probably not the true purpose of the proposed differential,
because intentional production of vine ripes was trivial in Florida;'88
and (3) they pointed to statistics suggesting the discriminatory im-
pact on Mexican producers, and argued that the real-and ille-
gal-motive was to achieve that impact. 8' On matters of industry
practices, particularly in connection with the second argument, con-
cessions from Florida growers who favored the differential were
somewhat useful. But again, it is not clear that live testimony sub-
"' Cf. Robinson, supra note 24, at 522-23. Professor Robinson's argument that cross-
examination forces "the agency to explain and articulate the assumptions and the founda-
tions on which its policy rests" is true as far as it goes; but he suggests no reason to believe
that (so far as most issues in most rulemaking proceedings are concerned) the same goal
cannot be achieved as well by less time-consuming methods.
' See 37 Fed. Reg. at 17483.
' , The Committee is comprised of Florida tomato growers appointed by the Secretary
after nominations from the industry. It performs a variety of implementation functions under
the Order. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 966.22-.35 (1975).
" Brief of West Mexican Vegetable Distributors Association, December 23, 1971 (De-
partment of Agriculture Dkt. No. AO-265-A3) at 53-57.
IM Id. at 49-52.
"' Id. at 19-26.
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ject to cross-examination was much more useful than, say, interro-
gatories to the Department would have been (perhaps supple-
mented by affidavits of the challengers' own allies).
Taking the tomato dispute as a whole, then, it seems doubtful
that the use of cross-examination was necessary to clarify either
of the critical issues-the actual difference in size between "vine
ripes" and "mature greens" at the times tomatoes are harvested,
and the actual economic impact of the size restrictions. It is inter-
esting that cross-examination scored its most dramatic hit when
used to test an individual human being's visual measurements of
tomato sizes. The Rauth testimony was fairly destroyed, so much
so that one can hardly imagine an agency relying on his measure-
ments in the slightest degree.'90 This observation tends to
corroborate the assumption, commonly asserted in support of the
hearsay exclusion, that cross-examination is valuable for challeng-
ing a declarant's perception.'91 But the hit scored on cross-
examination became rather like the proverbial punch into a bag of
sand or grain; the mass reshaped itself, and little was changed. The
case had been buttressed by enormous quantities of additional data
-most of it ultimately resting on sense perceptions that could never
have been subjected to cross-examination. In perspective, the one
demolished sense perception proved to be of little importance.'92
I" The Department's final decision can be read to suggest that it did put some small
stock in the testimony. See 37 Fed. Rag. at 17482.
"I See, e.g., Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62
HARv. L. REV. 177, 188 (1948).
,92 Interestingly, a similar situation developed in the Portland Cement case, on an issue
concerning which the court did not require cross-examination on remand. Ralph Striker, an
engineer who specialized in kiln design, submitted an analysis of the EPA's test at the Dragon
Cement Company's plant in Northhampton, Pennsylvania. By comparing the amount of CO
going into the plant with the amount of CO. the EPA had measured in the stack gases
emitted, he was able to show that the figures relied on by the EPA violated the laws of
chemistry. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 397-98 (D.C. Cir. 1973); EPA
Draft Response at 48-50 (Nov. 26, 1973); EPA Final Response, Appendix I at 12-14 (Nov.
1974). In its Draft Response on remand, the EPA conceded that a measurement error must
indeed have been made, but argued that it must have been made in the measurement of
particular chemicals in the stack gas (which would not undermine the test results), rather
than, as Striker assumed, in the measurement of the stack gas flow rate. The argument is
complex; happily, its merits are irrelevant to our inquiry. Even if Striker's contention had
been accepted in full, it would have altered the data of only one test out of three at the Dragon
Cement plant. The average test results from the Dragon plant would still have been well
below the standard promulgated by the EPA. Moreover, the Dragon plant had been only one
of six facilities tested. EPA Draft Response at 9-15, 48; EPA Final Response at 11-17, and
Appendix I, at 12. It is hard to see how cross-examination of, say, the sloppy measurer could
significantly alter the outcome.
The analysis presented here should not necessarily be limited to rulemaking. It would
seem equally applicable to any "polycentric" problem-one in which many factors are rele-
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B. Cross-Examination and Agency State of Mind
The remand in Walter Holm also raised issues concerning the
state of mind of members of the Florida Tomato Committee. '93 The
challengers contended that the Committee's purpose was to devise
a regulation that would protect the Florida tomato industry from
Mexican competition. Since the statute did not authorize that pur-
pose, the Secretary's action in imposing the regulation might well
have been struck down if an anti-import purpose had been found to
have tainted his consideration." 4 Since all parties apparently as-
sumed that the circumstances presented an exception to the rule of
Morgan I195 (which proscribes interrogation of administrators
about their mental processes), the challengers vigorously cross-
examined members of the Committee concerning their purposes. It
so happened, however, that the challengers were in possession of the
transcripts of tapes of the Committee's meetings. In view of the
Committee members' fairly express proclamations on the tapes that
they intended to protect Florida growers from Mexican competition,
cross-examination could add little. The challengers were able to
confront the Florida Tomato Committee manager and some of its
members with statistical data that tended to draw in question their
purported intention of "equalizing the burden," '96 and to rub their
noses in the transcripts, 97 but little more.
Granted, the presence of the tapes in Walter Holm was a happy
fortuity. It seems quite probable that other instances will arise
where Morgan IV's bar is lifted and where no such excellent substi-
tute for cross-examination exists. But it should not be expected that
circumstances of this kind are likely to result in a flowering of hy-
brid rulemaking. Normally, one supposes, it would be the court,
rather than the agency itself, that would conduct such an inquiry.
Walter Holm is probably an anomaly insofar as it involved an
agency conducting an inquiry into the state of mind of its own
vant, their relationship and respective weighting is unresolved, and the amount of data sup-
porting each factor is substantial. Licensing proceedings, for example, although classified as
"adjudication," see 5 U.S.C. § 551(6)-(7) (1970), would seem prone to the same difficulty.
,, On the nature of the Committee, see note 186 supra.
"' Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) ("To make
this finding [that the Secretary's decision was not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discre-
tion] the court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the
relevant factors .... "); Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 318-
19 (1933). See also Friendly, Chenery Revisited: Reflections on Reversal and Remand of
Administrative Orders, 1969 DUKE L.J. 199, 209-17.
's United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941).
" See, e.g., Tomato Remand Hearings at 2994-3062.
" See, e.g., id. at 1597-99.
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appendage, the Florida Tomato Committee, in order to resolve the
issue of whether its own decision making was tainted by defects in
that appendage's state of mind. Customarily, by contrast, the need
for inquiry into agency members' states of mind will not involve a
court imposing procedures upon an agency, but simply a court em-
ploying its own traditional procedures directly.
Furthermore, insofar as there is a place for cross-examination
at the agency in this regard, the rationale for it provides little basis
for a more general expansion in hybrid rulemaking. The issue of the
state of mind of agency members is quite different from the usual
sort of fact issue in rulemaking. It does not involve extrapolation of
data into the future, to determine whether the proposed rule will,
as applied to real-world facts, have effects in accord with the
agency's legislatively declared mandate. The concern is not in sub-
mitting data to rigorous analysis; it is in seeing how a few individu-
als will react when confronted with evidence that their public stance
has been a facade. Thus, when agency state of mind is at issue, there
is no thought that the agency members may save the rule by assert-
ing a legislatively authorized value judgment; the whole problem is
that they may have relied upon legislatively unauthorized values.
In short, the circumstances that we previously identified as the
peculiar characteristics of fact-finding for purposes of rule declaring
are absent here. 198
The Walter Holm setting should be distinguished from circum-
stances in which states of mind arise as a conventional issue within
rulemaking. 199 For instance, whenever a rule is to be promulgated
because of its asserted deterrence value, it will be relevant to inquire
whether the proposed rule will in fact have the desired effect on the
behavior of those sought to be deterred. One may want to survey,
for instance, the extent to which they are aware of existing penal-
ties.20 But cross-examination of the people who are the subjects of
the inquiry seems inherently infeasible, because it would consume
extraordinary amounts of time and probably would add little to the
survey itself.20 '
,' See text and notes at notes 21-25 supra.
," In International Harvester there was a substantive state-of-mind issue, namely,
whether Chrysler had shown compliance with the statutory prerequisite of making "good
faith" efforts to meet the standards. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-l(b) (5)(C)(ii) (1970). EPA panel
members vigorously cross-examined Chrysler executives on the point. On this issue, it would
seem that the proceeding was indeed adjudicatory, because Chrysler's entitlement to a one-
year suspension turned upon its own good faith.
2" See, e.g., F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE 145-47 (1973).
2' Cf. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 684 (S.D. N.Y. 1963).
But cf. Wirtz v. Baldor Electric Co., 337 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (persons who had filled in
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C. Putting Cross-Examination into Perspective
While the Walter Holm case simply fails to show that cross-
examination is an effective investigative procedure in the rulemak-
ing context, or even to suggest areas where imposing it upon an
agency is likely to be efficient, the other hybrid rulemaking cases
provide an even more telling indication of its value: they display
parties trading away the right to cross-examination, or abandoning
it without any offsetting benefit. In Appalachian Power, the chal-
lenging companies accepted a procedure that excluded cross-
examination, and obtained, principally, a deferral of proceedings
against them until completion of the EPA's review of the challenged
state implementation plans. And in International Harvester, Chrys-
ler thought it not worthwhile to exercise the right that it had so
vociferously sought.112
In view of this circumstance, it should not be overlooked that
a successful claim of a right to cross-examination offers challengers
to a rule certain advantages that are independent of whatever
elucidation it might furnish: First, and most obviously, cross-
examination presents an opportunity for delay (except in the prob-
ably rare case when a court remands for a hearing involving cross-
examination but leaves the rules in effect pending the hearing0 3).
Second, possession of a right to cross-examination gives challengers
a bargaining tool; by offering to waive the right, the challenger may
be able to bargain for almost any benefit that the agency can be-
stow, including, presumably, a relaxation of the substantive stan-
dard. Third, the challengers' possession of a right to cross-
examination may subtly exert pressure on the agency to take a
milder stand, quite apart from explicit bargaining about relinquish-
ment of the right. The milder the proposed rule, the more likely that
the agency can completely escape the investment of resources that
rulemaking through cross-examination techniques involves. Per-
haps more important, the agency may be tempted to adopt the
viewpoint of the challengers and thereby eliminate issues that
would provoke extended cross-examination. Fourth, challengers
may, by their treatment of witnesses, chill the readiness of scientists
a Bureau of Labor Statistics questionaire stated in affidavits that they had understood the
questionaire to mean something different from what the Bureau was trying to derive from
it). As for cross-examination of those who conducted the survey, an agency engaged in rule-
making would be interested not in their state of mind, but in their methodology.
n' Mobil Oil is excluded from consideration because the matter has been wholly in limbo
since the appellate court's decision. See text and notes at 123-25 supra.
23 Cf. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 921 (1974).
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to work for a regulatory agency. Rudeness and badgering, pedantry
and sophistry will ultimately take their toll."4 Fifth, cross-
examination of an unseasoned expert may score debating points
whose value is more apparent than real. If, for example, a scientist
has conducted an experiment and has omitted a particular precau-
tion because of a reasonable judgment that the value of the precau-
tion in assuring accuracy was outweighed by the effort necessary to
employ it, the challenger may be able to make him appear as a
knave or a fool. (One consolation, however, is that participation in
research for rulemaking may ultimately breed a strain of scientists
immune to this sort of cross-examination.)20 5
Apart from the leverage it gives challenging parties, cross-
examination may actually tend to frustrate its own supposed goal:
elucidation of the issues. Cross-examination virtually assures that
high-level agency decision makers will not participate, for they do
not have enough time for that sort of enterprise. For example, the
hearing in Walter Holm took place before a "hearing examiner"
without the power even to issue a recommended decision. By con-
trast, the inquiry conferences employed by the EPA in its emissions
suspension case, and on the issue of flue-gas desulphurization, 211
included substantial participation by the Administrator or his high-
est ranking assistants.
It may be that in other rulemaking contexts cross-examination
would play a vital role in elucidating relevant issues. Certainly the
cases described here represent too small a sample to establish the
contrary proposition. Moreover, this sample may be biased by the
presence of so many cases involving fact issues in the natural sci-
ences or engineering. In such cases the crucial issues seem usually
to be ones of methodology, and the history of scientific progress
would suggest that cross-examination is not particularly efficient for
resolving issues of that kind. Admittedly, the participants in tradi-
tional scientific controversy have stronger claims to being treated as
impartial than the experts involved in most rulemaking. The former
are usually not on the payroll of an organization with a large pecuni-
ary or ideological stake in the outcome. Nevertheless, the struggle
2I Cf. Hamilton, supra note 40, at 1290.
205 Notwithstanding this list of factors, which are largely negative from an agency's point
of view, it should be noted that on occasion agencies have more or less voluntarily tendered
challengers an opportunity to engage in cross-examination. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-
CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 471 n.9, 472 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Hindsight showed that the
agency had had little to fear: "[t]he questions actually asked tended to be few, sporadic,
and perfunctory ... " Id. at 471 n.9.
2I See text and notes at notes 237-46 infra (on inquiry conferences).
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of scientists for the acceptance of their ideas, or for clarifications of
accepted ideas, whether in the ivory tower or the context of decision
making, seems to have advanced through relatively informal proce-
dures.207
D. Judicial Choices Concerning Cross-Examination
1. Is it needed? The arguments advanced in this section of the
article suggest certain conclusions about when a court should
impose hybrid rulemaking through cross-examination and how it
should be done. Given the questionable efficacy of cross-
examination in the cases that have been surveyed, it would seem
that courts should impose it only when the challenger has dis-
charged the burden of doing at least the following:
First, he must identify with particularity the issues requiring
cross-examination. 211 Only then can the court competently evaluate
the claim. If the agency's record in the proceeding is too opaque for
the court justly to put this burden on the challenger, a remand for
purposes of clarifying the record may be in order.
Second, he must demonstrate the substantiality of the issues to
be resolved by cross-examination. If resolution of them in accord-
ance with the challenger's factual contentions would only trivially
alter the data base for the agency decision, cross-examination would
clearly be a waste .21
Third, he must demonstrate that less onerous procedures will
probably not be able to resolve the issue with sufficient accuracy.
For example, if sense perceptions are at stake,210 and were made by
27 The reasons advanced by Wigmore for the qualified exception to the hearsay rule for
learned treatises seem relevant to reliance on uncross-examined evidence in this context: (1)
necessity, because of the extraordinary inconvenience that would follow from throwing out
all expert testimony not based exclusively on personal observation, and (2) trustworthiness,
derived largely from the authors' interests in preserving and enhancing their reputations
within the scientific fraternity. See VI WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §§ 1691-92 (3d ed. 1940).
As Judge Leventhal notes, dissenting in Cooper Labs., Inc. v. Comm'r, 501 F.2d 772, 793
(D.C. Cir. 1974),
[A] particular case may involve the kind of issue that calls for an oral argument
rather than an evidentiary hearing or for a legislative rather than an adjudicative hear-
ing. These comments are highly pertinent when what is at issue are technical questions
of methodology. Indeed, in such a case the reality of technical dialogue and interchange
of view can perhaps best be provided by an on the record conference-hearing procedure,
modeled on conference discussions between lawyers and experts. ...
2" For instance, there would have to be far more particularity than Chrysler's vague goal
of cross-examining catalyst manufacturers in the emissions suspension case. See note 211
infra.
See text and notes at note 192 supra.
210 See text and notes at notes 176-78, 191 supra.
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persons not under the control of the challenger " (or of a party with
an interest identical to that of the challenger), the challenger can
be said to have made out his prima facie case on this score.
2. Procedural Issues. Once the claim of a need for cross-
examination has been favorably resolved, the court must face the
issue of the proper forum: court or agency. As argued above, '2 1 2 the
principle of agency autonomy suggests a presumption in favor of
remand to the agency. In some cases, Congress itself seems to have
pointed the courts in precisely that direction. 213 Other circumstan-
ces may point powerfully in the other direction. Sometimes, for
example, the well-known exhortation not to put the fox in charge
of the chicken coop may apply. If the challengers have made a
showing sufficiently powerful to persuade a court that Morgan IVs
211 The International Harvester case points up the problem of identifying the parties with
the best access to the underlying sense perceptions. In that case, it will be recalled, Chrysler
made a passionate plea for the right to cross-examination, won it, and never used it. In the
course of its plea, Chrysler had argued that the issue turned on the efficacy of catalysts, and
that accurate resolution of the issue required that the auto manufacturers have an opportun-
ity to cross-examine executives of the catalyst manufacturers. The difficulty with the argu-
ment was that in practice it was the auto companies who had best access to the relevant sense
perceptions, since it was their employees who had done the testing. There had been some
testing by Englehard Industries, but it had been relatively exceptional. See Emissions Sus-
pension Remand Hearings at 915. See also id. at 969-70. In view of the auto companies' control
over those who had conducted the testing and who therefore had made the relevant sense
perceptions and transformed them into statistics, it is not surprising that, on this point at
least, the auto companies backed away from their interest in cross-examination.
2,2 See text and note at note 96 supra.
223 For example, section 19 of the Natural Gas Act provides that on review of FPC orders
under the Act:
If any party shall apply to the courts for leave to adduce additional evidence, and shall
show to the satisfaction of the court that such additional evidence is material and that
there were reasonable grounds for failure to adduce such evidence in the proceedings
before the Commission, the court may order such additional evidence to be taken before
the Commission and to be adduced upon the hearing in such manner and upon such
terms and conditions as to the court may seem proper. . . .
15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1970). See also Consumer Product Safety Act § 11(b), 15 U.S.C. §
2060(b) (1972).
Language in the Administrative Orders Review Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2347(b) (1970), might
seem to point the other way for remands of orders under its coverage (including certain final
orders of the Federal Communications Commission, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Federal
Maritime Commission, the Maritime Administration, and the Atomic Energy Commission).
It provides that when an agency "has not held a hearing," and when, further, "a hearing is
not required by law and a genuine issue of material fact is presented," the court "shall...
transfer the proceedings to a district court. . . ." However, in view of the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Florida E.C. Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973), treating a section 553
rulemaking as a "hearing" within the meaning of the Esch Act (see id. at 240), it would seem
that a section 553 rulemaking cannot be regarded as one in which no "hearing" is required
by law. On this interpretation, section 2347(b) is inapplicable and, if the Administrative
Orders Review Act is relevant at all, section 2347(c), which contemplates remand to the
agency for taking of additional evidence, would be the relevant provision.
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bar against inquiry into the agency's thought process should be
lifted, it would ordinarily seem preferable that trial of the matter
should proceed before a court rather than the agency." 4
In a case in which trial de novo in court is more appropriate,
there may be difficulties in locating a court. If the controlling stat-
ute provides for review in a court of appeals, but does not authorize
transfer to a district court for resolution of factual issues," 5 no clear
route to a district court is evident. 216 Section 703 of the APA provides
for review in any court of competent jurisdiction in the event of
"inadequacy" of the statutorily prescribed form of review; that con-
dition is arguably present when there remains a factual issue whose
resolution is essential for responsible substantive review, yet re-
mand to the agency is inappropriate. Moreover, section 704 provides
that "final agency action for which there is no adequate remedy in
a court" is "subject to judicial review." In these circumstances, a
challenger might be well advised to commence review proceedings
at both levels-the statutorily prescribed petition to the court of
appeals and a claim in the district court under the sections just
mentioned. 27 If the challenger fails to initiate a district court action,
the present statutes do not readily suggest a way for the court of
appeals to bring in the district court's adjudicatory skills.
Delicate problems of timing may arise as well. Because of re-
cent relaxations of ripeness requirements, courts often engage in
judicial review of rules prior to agency enforcement. But there may
be a temptation to say, as the Sixth Circuit did in Buckeye Power,
Inc. v. EPA, 2' that any factual issues relating to the validity of the
regulation should be deferred until the time of enforcement proceed-
ings if the issues demand adjudicatory techniques. The conclusion
seems too facile. The justification for easing ripeness requirements
has been increased concern about the impact of the regulation upon
21 The court in Walter Holm was evidently too optimistic in its hope that ambiguities
in the relationship between the tomato industry and the Secretary of Agriculture could be
resolved, or at least rendered irrelevant, in hearings conducted before the Department with
a right of cross-examination. Litigation inquiring into that relationship has not yet abated.
See cases cited note 110 supra.
215 Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2347(b)(3) (1970), discussed in note 213 supra.
211 A factual inquiry by the court of appeals is a conceivable alternative. See note 84
supra.
217 Some basis for jurisdiction would also, of course, be necessary. In circuits recognizing
sections 702, 703, and 704 as jurisdictional grants, the search would be easy, at least if the
arguments in the text are accepted. Elsewhere, an independent basis of jurisdiction would
be necessary. For a recent summary of cases on the issue, see Pickus v. United States Bd. of
Parole, 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
214 481 F.2d 162, 173 (6th Cir. 1973); cf. Verkuil, supra note 64, at 204. But cf. Getty Oil
Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349, 355-356 (3d Cir. 1972).
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the conduct of affected industries prior to the moment of any en-
forcement proceedings219 (and, perhaps, lessened concern that a
court should not speak to an issue until the imminence of civil or
criminal penalties makes judicial review-if it is ever to occur-
an immediate necessity). But the impact upon industry conduct is
not limited or qualified merely because the validity of the regulation
turns upon as yet unresolved factual issues. At most, the inconveni-
ence occasioned by the need for some cross-examination should be
an element to be weighed when the court considers the ripeness
issue. Once the court has found that the regulation is ripe for judi-
cial review, however, there would seem to be extraordinary awk-
wardness in trying to determine its validity without regard to the
factual problems, leaving their resolution to another day. Such a
bifurcation can rarely satisfy the interests of either side. To be sure,
Congress's allocation of review jurisdiction between the district
courts and the courts of appeals may mean that the courts are
reduced to a Hobson's choice-between the inconvenience of bifur-
cation on the one hand and that of trial direct by the court of
appeals or its reference to a master on the other.22
V. THE UTILITY OF PROCEDURES LESS ONEROUS THAN CROSS-
EXAMINATION
Attention must now be directed at the three methods that the
EPA has employed in its effort to assure challengers of its rules a
meaningful "opportunity to participate" in the rulemaking process:
(1) an advance written statement of methodology; (2) an inquiry
conference, on- or off-the-record; and (3) written agency answers to
interrogatories. In a way it is a pity to have to itemize them into
categories, for one gets the impression that it is the deft meshing of
the devices that is most effective in complying with the spirit of the
hybrid rulemaking cases. Nonetheless, it seems necessary to distin-
guish among them in order to describe them.
A. Written Statements of Methodology
In at least four cases, the EPA has tried to furnish (or has
committed itself to furnishing) a clear statement of its methodology
well in advance of any final agency action, thus permitting detailed
criticism. These instances include the remands in International
2I Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152 (1967); cf. Vining, Direct Judicial Review
and the Doctrine of Ripeness in Administrative Law, 69 MICH. L. REv. 1443, 1502-04 (1971).
"I See cases cited at note 84 supra.
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Harvester,221 Appalachian Power,"' and Portland Cement,23 and the
EPA's entire process for promulgating effluent limitations guide-
lines under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.224 In
Appalachian Power, the process has begun fairly recently, pursuant
to the stipulations by the parties. In Portland Cement, the EPA's
draft engendered extensive comment, but its final statement in
essence reaffirmed the original standards. The challengers again
sought judicial review, but in doing so they virtually abandoned the
technical arguments that had been the occasion of the remand,
preferring instead to press constitutional claims that the court of
appeals had already rejected.25 The court of appeals affirmed the
standards per curiam.28 This history suggests that the remand per-
formed its intended function.2 1 It is an open question, however,
whether it would have accomplished as much in the absence of an
appellate opinion pinpointing what the court perceived as material
substantive gaps. The International Harvester and effluent limita-
tions instances require more extensive discussion.
Shortly before the public hearing on remand in International
Harvester, the EPA made available to the auto companies a forty-
eight page statement of its proposed methodology. The statement
essentially mooted one of the auto companies' major criticisms of
the first proceeding-namely, that the agency's failure to analyze
the data in terms of "engine families" invalidated its results .2 The
challengers had advanced two arguments against that omission.
First, EPA procedures for certifying the manufacturers' production
lines did proceed engine-family-by-engine-family; consequently,
the omission had highlighted the agency's failure to link the reason-
ing by which it concluded that the manufacturers did not need an
extension to the criteria by which it would later grant or deny certifi-
cation to produce autos. Because each engine family presents a
unique pollution problem, awareness of such a link had been impor-
221 Pursuant to court direction, International Harvester Corp v. Ruckelsbaus 478 F.2d
615, 631-33, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
222 As a result of settlement stipulations, Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495
(4th Cir. 1973); see text and note at note 169 supra.
221 Pursuant to court direction, Portland Cement Ass'n. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375,
392-95, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
22 38 Fed. Reg. 21202 (1973).
221 See Brief of Petitioner Following Remand, D.C. Cir. No. 72-1073.
21 Portland Cement Ass'n v. Train, 513 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
222 See note 175 supra.
2u Joint Supplement to Briefs of Petitioners General Motors Corp., Chrysler Corp. and
Ford Motor Co. 6-8, 10-11; Ford Motor Co. Brief 33-35; Ford Reply Brief 7-11. Note that, even
apart from the directions from the court, the process of litigation itself may have constituted
part of the dialogue between the auto companies and EPA.
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tant to the companies. Second, the omission had made it impossible
to develop any theory for predicting what portion of the nation's
total 1975 auto demand could be satisfied if 1975 standards were not
suspended.229 Issuance of the EPA's proposed methodology resolved
the entire issue, and, by articulating definitions of the various en-
gine families, made it possible for the controversy to move to more
refined issues: details of the process of making predictions for each
engine family. Later, when EPA staff and auto company technicians
met in Ann Arbor in an off-the-record conference, the proposed
methodology provided a starting point for discussion. 0
Another example of how the EPA's announcement of its metho-
dology on remand led to fruitful criticism was the agency's adoption
of the "Monte Carlo" statistical technique. On remand, the EPA
asked the manufacturers to submit proposals for the methodology
to be used, and the Monte Carlo method was suggested by General
Motors.23 ' The method permits one to transform data that varies on
a random basis into usable predictions. For example, in different
tests of the same car, emission levels vary randomly. 32 By means of
the Monte Carlo method, it is possible to derive a figure indicating
the maximum emission level for cars of that type with a ninety-five
percent probability of accuracy.2 -3 The technique thus made it possi-
ble for the agency to comply with the appellate court's demand that
its predictions have demonstrable "statistical reliability." '234
The EPA's device for promulgating effluent limitation guide-
lines under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act represents a
systematic transformation of rulemaking into a two-round process,
instead of the single round minimally required by section 553. Prior
to its initial notice of proposed rulemaking, the EPA makes avail-
able to any interested person a technical analysis of the issues,
prepared by private consultants under contract with the EPA. Pub-
lic comments on these drafts are solicited, and only afterwards does
the EPA promulgate its proposed rule. Simultaneously with the
notice of proposed rulemaking, it publishes its own draft report
trying to substantiate the proposed rules. Agency personnel did
2n Cf. 478 F.2d at 640-41.
23 Telephone interview with Thomas Austin, EPA staff, Oct. 1, 1974.
23 See Technical Appendix to EPA Administrator's April 11, 1973 Decision, at 38.
212 Id. at 38-40.
21 Of course, this confidence level assumes the accuracy of the data and the soundness
of all other aspects of the methodology.
2 478 F.2d at 648; see the use of figures in the Administrator's April 11, 1973 decision,
38 Fed. Reg. at 10323.
1 See 38 Fed. Reg. 21202-06 (1973).
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not describe this procedure as a product of the hybrid rulemaking
cases,28 although the agency's adoption of the procedure may reflect
its internalization of the norm imposed in those cases. From the
agency's point of view, the process is not a burden but simply an
efficient way of carrying out its substantive mandate. 7
B. Inquiry Conferences
What I have called the "inquiry conference" has figured in a
variety of EPA proceedings: the International Harvester case, both
originally and on remand; the agency's "hearing" on flue-gas desul-
furization ("FGD"); and the agency's promulgation of effluent
guidelines under the Water Pollution Control Act for the pulp and
paper industry and for the steam electric power industry.
The agency's original hearing on the auto companies' applica-
tion for a one-year suspension of standards represented something
of an innovation. Speakers for affected companies and interest
groups delivered statements, and were subjected to questions from
the members of the EPA panel, which sometimes included the
Administrator and almost always the Assistant Administrator for
the Office of Enforcement and General Counsel. In addition, every-
one in the audience was free to submit written questions to mem-
"I E.g., interview with Robert V. Zener, Deputy General Counsel, at Washington, D.C.,
Aug. 19, 1974. One EPA lawyer expressly denied that the procedure was in any way attributa-
ble to the line of cases analyzed in this article. Interview with G. William Frick, at Washing-
ton, D.C., Aug. 21, 1974.
I The EPA declared in its announcement of the proposed procedures: "EPA believes
that the exposure of the technical basis and reasoning underlying regulations to be estab-
lished pursuant to sections 304(b), 306 and 307(c) is essential to the promulgation of sound
effluent limitations guidelines and standards of performance for new sources." 38 Fed. Reg.
at 21202.
The FAA, the CAB, the FPC, and the ICC, and perhaps other agencies, have (both before
the earliest and after the latest of the hybrid rulemaking cases) employed an "Advance Notice
of Rulemaking" to achieve what amounts to two rounds of notice and comment. See, for
example, FAA notices published at 39 Fed. Reg. 45044 (Dec. 30, 1974); 39 Fed. Reg. 11193
(Mar. 26, 1974); 39 Fed. Reg. 5785 (Feb. 15, 1974) (initiating a process called "First Biennial
Airworthiness Regulations Review," promulgating a schedule contemplating final adoption
of any resulting amendments in February 1976 and providing not only for two full rounds of
notice and comment but also for conferences to elucidate issues); 38 Fed. Reg. 14757 (June
5, 1973); and CAB notices published at 37 Fed. Reg. 15518 (Aug. 3, 1972); 36 Fed. Reg. 20309
(Oct. 20, 1971); and 36 Fed. Reg. 2514 (Feb. 5, 1971).
The two rounds of notice and comment initiated by these advance notices should be
distinguished in purpose from the two rounds that were initiated by the EPA in the water
effluent guidelines context. For the EPA, the focus was on assuring a full canvass of complex
scientific, technological, and economic issues. In the FAA and CAB notices, however, the
agency has sketched out an area under consideration, suggested some issues that ought to be
resolved, and called for comment in a very openended fashion. The FAA-CAB two-round
process is thus less sharply tailored to the resolution of complex methodological issues.
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bers of the panel, who would then usually put the question or its
substance to the speaker. Counsel for Ford Motor Company and for
the Natural Resources Defense Council were the most active sub-
mitters of questions. In the remand hearing, which followed the
same procedure, one such question hit extraordinary paydirt: in
response to a question from the NRDC lawyer, a representative of
Engelhard Industries (a catalyst manufacturer) testified that
Chrysler executives had told him that they were refusing to buy
catalysts from Engelhard in order to punish the company for its
testimony in the original hearings. 5 Chrysler escaped denial of sus-
pension only because the economic consequences of selective denial
were so drastic; EPA felt virtually bound to find "good faith" unless
confronted with absolute proof of its absence. 21
In addition to the public hearings on remand, the EPA ar-
ranged for an off-the-record conference in Ann Arbor on technical
methodology. At this meeting, auto company experts were able to
state in detail their objections to the proposed methodology, and the
EPA technical staff were able to respond. Substantial modifications
were made as a result of the meeting. 0 The style of the meeting was
relatively informal, featuring more rapid-fire, spontaneous give-
and-take than was characteristic of the hearings before the EPA
panel.
The other inquiry conferences amounted to variations on the
above themes. The conference on effluent guidelines for the pulp-
and-paper industry, called by the EPA in response to pressure from
industry representatives, was largely dominated by speeches by in-
dustry spokesmen. Although the industry participants were invited
to put questions to the agency technical staff,2 11 they chose not to
do so. The agency technical staff questioned them closely, on the
other hand, probing the theories behind their complaints.242 Thus,
by choice of the industry representatives, the conference did nothing
to clarify agency reasoning for them. In similar hearings in connec-
tion with steam electric power plants, however, industry representa-
tives used their opportunity, so that the flow of questioning went
both ways. This conference, like the Ann Arbor meeting, constituted
"I Emissions Suspension Remand Hearings at 982-95, 1020-40.
2n1 See 38 Fed. Reg. at 10327-330.
240 Telephone interviews with William F. Pedersen, EPA staff attorney, and Thomas
Austin, EPA technical staff, Oct. 1, 1974.
2"1 Technical Meeting-Effluent Limitations Guidelines for Pulp, Paper and Paperboard
Manufacturing Point Source Category and Builders Paper Board Manufacturing Point
Source Category, April 4, 1974, at 8-10.
242 Id., passim.
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the EPA's alternative to the cross-examination right demanded by
industry.24 Unlike the Ann Arbor meeting, it was on-the-record.
The FGD hearings were unique in that they were aimed not at
making a "rule," but at policy-making in a broader sense. The
report that emerged from the conference produced recommenda-
tions in three categories: (1) recommendations addressed to the util-
ity companies, in essence exhorting them to get cracking; (2)
recommendations addressed to the EPA itself and to the states,
urging them to direct a variety of carrots and sticks toward the
utilities; and (3) recommendations relating to the sequence and
pacing of compliance schedules to be developed by negotiation be-
tween the utilities, the states, and the EPA.44 The hearing was not
viewed as a means of conforming to the mandates of the hybrid
rulemaking cases, but rather as a catalyst for resolution of some
fundamental policy issues at a high executive level. 45 As in the auto
emissions suspension hearings, an EPA panel presided. Here the
flow of questions went in every direction: from the EPA panel to
industry representatives and to EPA technical experts; from EPA
technicians to industry technicians, and the reverse; and even from
industry representatives to other industry representatives.
At least from the EPA's point of view, the FGD hearing was a
sound investment of time. Although the EPA did not lose its basic
belief in the efficacy of FGD, the hearing did persuade high-level
EPA personnel of the reality of several utility industry problems: (1)
the greater readiness of state regulatory commissions to allow utili-
ties to pass through the costs of switching to low-sulfur fuel, on the
one hand, than to permit similar pass-throughs of FGD installation
costs, on the other; (2) the seriousness of the problems relating to
FGD malfunctions and the need to reassure the power companies
that malfunctions would not impose substantial risks of
noncompliance penalties; and (3) the industry's difficulties in trying
to achieve the designated goals within the time spans proposed by
EPA. 246
23 Counsel for the Utility Water Act Group, George Freeman, indicated in a telephone
interview that EPA's conduct up through the inquiry conference was consistent with its duties
under the International Harvester case, notwithstanding the absence of cross-examination.
September 10, 1974.
2 Report of the EPA Hearing Panel, National Public Hearings on Power Plant Compli-
ance with Sulfur Oxide Air Pollution Regulations [hereinafter cited as FGD Report] 9-10
(January 1974).
245 Interview with Richard Wilson, Director, Division of Stationary Source Enforcement,
EPA, at Washington, D.C., Aug. 22, 1974.
21 Id.; FGD Report at 8-9, 63-65.
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Are these conferences more effective on- or off-the-record? Each
alternative has the defects of its virtues. The off-the-record ap-
proach makes it possible for participants to be less cagey, more
open, and better able to focus upon the search for truth; by the same
token, it offers the anxious participant little or no assurance that he
has pinned the other side down to any position. The calculus for the
on-the-record conference presents a mirror image. Resolution of the
issue must turn on particular facts. 247
C. Interrogatories
The third discrete device is to send interrogatories to the
agency. This approach was employed by counsel for the steam elec-
tric power plants in connection with the setting of effluent limita-
tions guidelines. Its desirability depends on the comparative advan-
tages of written as against oral questioning. Again, each seems ap-
propriate in its place. Relying on written questions is time-
consuming and the answers are inevitably labored; and, to be effec-
tive, the device may require follow-up in the form of additional
interrogatories or oral questioning. The conference approach, on the
other hand, permits rapid exchange of questions and ideas, but with
the risk that statements will be made clumsily and will leave what
in hindsight appears to be a murky record.
D. The Judicial Role
Although we saw a number of doctrinal difficulties that may
arise when a court seeks to implement a challenger's right to cross-
examination in rulemaking proceedings, courts should have few
problems inducing agencies to adopt hybrid rulemaking procedures
like the ones discussed in this section. Probably the style of remand
typified by Chenery I offers a satisfactory framework. The premise
in all "hybrid rulemaking" cases is that the challengers have raised
questions about the agency's substantive action that are so serious
that the agency must justify its position more adequately than it
has. This is the essence of a Chenery-type remand, which affords an
agency an opportunity to identify whatever links it purports to find
between its action and its substantive mandate. The distinctive
feature in the cases now under discussion is that the inadequacy of
the agency's explanation results from its failure to have made it
?AT Note that the stipulations settling Appalachian Power gave the choice between an on-
the-record or off-the-record conference to the challengers of the rule. See text and note at note
169 supra.
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possible for the challengers to identify and critique its methodology
earlier in the proceedings.21 It would not seem a material extension
of Chenery if the court, in ordering such a remand, were to point
out the problem. The agency would then be on notice that if it again
failed to give the challengers an adequate opportunity to critique it
in advance, it would only be exposing itself to the risk of yet another
round: not because of its failure to adhere to any particular proce-
dure, but because its reasoning would still appear insufficient in the
face of the challengers' factual contentions. Thus, a court can assure
that issues are aired sufficiently for it to perform its function of
substantive review, without impinging upon the ability of the
agency to select the procedural devices that appear most suitable
in light of the substantive issues involved and the agency's institu-
tional capacities.
CONCLUSION
In closing, it is appropriate to point out the aspect of the hybrid
rulemaking cases that seems to enjoy the greatest capacity for
growth. All the features of cross-examination that set it apart from
"normal" rulemaking procedural techniques have made it
seem-deceptively, I suggest-particularly attractive to the courts
that have found "notice-and-comment" inadequate in four of these
cases. When the relatively modest role of cross-examination on re-
mand is examined, the attractions are diminished. What emerges
as more vital, and certainly more readily susceptible to frequent
application, is the principle of assuring challengers timely access to
the critical reasoning processes of the agencies.
In making that access real, the cases have helped to generate a
series of flexible devices: double rounds of notice-and-comment;
conferences with varying degrees of formality; and agency answers
to interrogatories. Although for many rulemaking proceedings the
use of even one of those devices might be overkill, for others-where
decisions of dramatic economic or social impact are at stake-they
represent useful tools for disciplining agency action without entan-
" But cf. South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974), reviewing the
EPA's Metropolitan Boston Air Quality Transportation Plan. The court noted that a need
for further hearing arose out of the petitioners' failure to present to the EPA the data that
they had presented to the court. Thus the defect arose from petitioners' "fault," but the court
justified its imposition of a burden on the EPA by noting the importance of the subject to
the public at large. Id. at 666. This article has not analyzed the South Terminal case in detail,
because the hearing on remand was to be conducted under the same ground rules that the
EPA had applied originally. Thus, the case did not impose new procedural standards on the
EPA; it was simply a remand for more of the same.
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gling it in elaborate procedures. Whether a court should ever man-
date the use of any particular device seems doubtful. But the courts
may insist that the "opportunity to participate" afforded by section
553 be meaningful; and they may demand that agencies develop a
record that enables a reviewing court to find an intelligible answer
for each substantial challenge posed.249 Under these judicial pres-
sures, agencies should be able to work out the detailed procedures
most suitable to each specific task.
'"2 For recent discussion of the problem of establishing a "record" for purposes of notice-
and-comment rulemaking, see Recommendation 74-4, 1973-74 REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 58; Pedersen, Informal Ruelmaking at the Environmental
Protection Agency, to be published in a forthcoming issue of YALE L.J. (title may differ). See
also Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 321-22 (5th Cir. 1974), in which Judge Clark, concurring,
noted: "No formal hearing has ever been held in this highly technical, factually complex
matter. The administrative 'record' upon which we had to base our review was comprised of
only the sparest of documentation, for it essentially evolved from an act of agency rule-
making. .. ."
